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In late November 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in United States v. Faulkner,1 an outcome that, in the larger 
scheme of things, should not warrant attention; the Court denies 
thousands of such petitions every year.2 By deciding not to reexamine 
Faulkner, however, the Court failed to settle a matter dividing the 
federal courts: whether discovery by police of an arrest warrant during 
an illegal seizure constitutes an intervening circumstance sufficient to 
purge the taint of the seizure, allowing use of evidence secured by an 
attendant search. As a consequence of the Court’s certiorari denial, 
criminal defendants can be prosecuted in the Eighth Circuit on the 
basis of such evidence,3 as can defendants in the Seventh Circuit,4 yet 
those in the Sixth,5 Ninth,6 and Tenth Circuits7 cannot. 
That Fourth Amendment doctrine differs based on geographic 
happenstance would likely come as a surprise to most Americans, who 
believe—as John Jay put it in the Federalist Papers—that “we have 
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere 
enjoying the same national rights, privileges, protection.”8 However, 
 
 1.  636 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011). 
 2.  See The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2011) (noting that 
the Court granted only 1.1% of 7,868 petitions filed in its 2010 Term).  
 3.  Faulkner, 636 F.3d at 1015–17.  
 4.  See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521–23 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
973 (1997).  
 5.  See United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 6.  See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90–91 (9th Cir. 1973).  
 7.  See United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 8.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38–39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also, e.g., 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 130 (2001) (“[O]ur sense of national 
identity as a people literally constituted by the Constitution is linked indissolubly with ideals of 
common constitutional rights . . . . [N]ational ideals require national enforcement as an 
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the outcome in Faulkner, and many other instances in which 
intermediate federal courts differ on constitutional questions, belies 
this understanding. On questions not yet squarely resolved by the 
Supreme Court, the nation’s twelve general jurisdiction federal courts 
of appeals decide as they see fit,9 subject only to a norm of intracircuit 
stare decisis.10 And because the Court agrees to hear only a fraction of 
cases in which circuit courts differ,11 the decisions of federal appellate 
courts irreducibly “set the legal ground rules for citizens.”12 
While circuit splits have been the subject of frequent scholarly 
attention, research and debate has focused on federal civil (typically 
statutory) law, not constitutional doctrine.13 So conceived, splits 
garnering the Court’s certiorari attention have been characterized as 
often “trivial” in nature,14 and prompted the view that associated 
“problems of disuniformity are very much overstated.”15 This Article 
redresses this empirical deficit relative to constitutional law and 
reaches the opposite conclusions. Focusing in particular on Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, with its significant everyday impact on the 
 
affirmation of our shared nationhood.”); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State 
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 762, 824 (1992) (“Our constitutional language and culture 
hold the U.S. Constitution to be the repository of the fundamental values of the national 
community, a community to which every citizen belongs.”).  
 9.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3, at 11 
(7th ed. 2011) (noting existence of eleven numbered circuit courts of appeals, encompassing 
states and territories, and the court of appeals for the District of Columbia). In addition to the 
twelve geographically arrayed courts of general jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
hears specialized federal appeals such as those concerning patents and cases decided by the 
Court of Federal Claims. Id.  
 10.  See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
 11.  See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in 
the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449 (2009) (recognizing that the Court 
addresses less than half of the circuit splits identified by litigants). 
 12.  FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (2007); see also 
id. (“[I]n large measure, it is the circuit courts that create U.S. law. They represent the iceberg, 
of which the Supreme Court is but the most basic visible tip. The circuit courts play by far the 
greatest legal policymaking role in the U.S. judicial system.”); Richard A. Posner, Judicial 
Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005) 
(“Entire fields of law are left mainly to the courts of appeals to shape.”).  
 13.  See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit 
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 
608 (2003); Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY. 
L. REV. 535, 549 (2010); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569 
(2008).  
 14.  Frost, supra note 13, at 1634–35; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke…, 119 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 67, 69 (2010).  
 15.  Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 69; see also Frost, supra note 13, at 1569 (“It appears the 
Supreme Court selected these issues for review solely because the lower courts were divided, not 
because the issues were of great significance for the nation.”).  
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nation’s populace,16 the Article highlights the existence of over three 
dozen extant circuit splits. Moreover, as the results reported on here 
make clear, splits do not, as Court of Appeals Judge Harvie Wilkinson 
has posited, get resolved because “the Court can be counted upon to 
weigh in.”17 As a consequence, the rights of individuals, and the 
authority of law enforcement to conduct searches and seizures, vary in 
nature and scope throughout the land, often for extended periods of 
time. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of 
the empirical work conducted to date on circuit splits. Most notable 
among these efforts are the landmark studies undertaken by Professor 
Arthur Hellman, who examined splits in terms of their effect 
(“intolerability”) and longevity (“persistence”). Like others, Professor 
Hellman focused on civil law and concluded that splits discerned in his 
study sample were not problematic under either measure. While 
alluding to the fact that variant circuit positions on constitutional 
criminal procedure matters could be outcome determinative, and thus 
raise equal treatment concerns, the study ignored the splits because, 
unlike areas such as federal tax and labor law, they did not affect 
“multicircuit actors.”18 
Part II discusses the results of a study that examines the 
nature and extent of Fourth Amendment circuit splits. Drawing on a 
variety of sources, including a Westlaw database search covering a 
ten-year period, the study reveals the existence of more than three 
dozen issues on which federal circuits currently differ (in several 
instances reflecting more than two positions). The issues pertain to a 
broad range of matters that commonly arise in federal criminal cases, 
concerning police search and seizure practices, the application and 
reach of the exclusionary rule, and appellate standards of review. 
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s averred concern over 
disuniformity,19 and the expectation that splits bear special weight in 
 
 16.  See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 
xix (2008) (observing that the Fourth Amendment “is the most commonly implicated and 
litigated part of our Constitution” and that it serves as “the foundation upon which other 
freedoms rest”).  
 17.  Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 71–72. 
 18.  See infra notes 51–65 and accompanying text.  
 19. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415–16 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(asserting “the necessity of uniformity” and that “nothing but contradiction and confusion can 
proceed” from the Court’s failure to resolve constitutional conflict); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (Story, J.) (emphasizing “the importance, and even necessity 
of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the 
purview of the constitution” and condemning disuniformity as “truly deplorable”). For a more 
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its certiorari process,20 the Court regularly fails to reconcile the 
conflicts, ensuring that the divergent outcomes endure and multiply 
with the passage of time. Part II closes with a discussion of how and 
why the splits arise and persist, a phenomenon that is itself curious 
given the increasingly conservative ideological tenor of the federal 
judiciary, a majority of Supreme Court Justices typically unenamored 
of Fourth Amendment protections, and the Court’s purported desire 
for clarity in Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Part III examines the normative and practical implications of 
the splits. For some time, a spirited debate has existed over whether 
intercircuit conflict in general is problematic. Indeed, those dubious of 
whether concern is warranted often maintain that splits actually have 
salutary effect: first, allowing for the geographically based circuits to 
experiment, much as federalism permits states to serve as 
Brandeisian laboratories;21 and second, permitting views to “percolate” 
over time, enhancing the jurisprudential quality of eventual Supreme 
Court outcomes.22 Neither contention enjoys support, however. Not 
only are constitutional rights not the proper subject of 
experimentation, as the Court itself has insisted, but the circuits 
themselves can scarcely be thought regionally cohesive or 
representative (for instance the Sixth Circuit encompasses both 
Tennessee and Michigan), and judges on circuit panels need not even 
hail from within the circuit on which they sit. Likewise, based on the 
study’s findings, the avowed benefits of percolation do not significantly 
manifest in the Fourth Amendment decisions ultimately rendered by 
the Court.23 
Part III then surveys the broader consequences of the splits 
uncovered. Perhaps most fundamentally, the splits undermine the 
nation’s sense of shared constitutional culture, highlighting the 
 
recent pronouncement to this same effect, see Justices in Their Own Words: Granting Certiorari 
(C-SPAN television broadcast June 19, 2009), available at http://supremecourt.c-
span.org/Video/JusticeOwnWords.aspx (Chief Justice John Roberts) (“Our main job is to try to 
make sure [that] federal law is uniform across the country.”).  
 20.  See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (specifying as a “compelling reason” to grant a certiorari petition 
that “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter”); see also Edward A. 
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1685, 1697–98 (2000) (noting testimony of Chief Justice Taft and Justice 
Van Devanter before Congress on how the expansion of the Court’s certiorari prerogative and  
discretionary docket, with adoption of the Judges ’ Bill of 1925, would promote uniformity in 
federal law). 
 21.  See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.  
 23.  See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text. 
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inability of the courts of a single sovereign—the U.S. Government, 
perceived by most Americans as the prime expositor of national 
constitutional law24—to render consistent constitutional outcomes.25 
Splits also create a variety of practical difficulties: they present 
difficult choice of law questions when federal prosecutions entail police 
work crossing circuit boundaries; complicate whether a right is 
“clearly established” in constitutional tort litigation or “settled” for 
purposes of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule; and 
contribute to possible federal forum shopping.26 
Part IV considers how best to redress these difficulties. As the 
results reported on here make clear, the mechanism now used to 
resolve splits—discretionary certiorari—is not up to the task. Even 
though the Court’s plenary docket is now smaller than at any time in 
its recent history,27 splits persist on numerous Fourth Amendment 
issues, many of which can figure critically in federal criminal 
prosecutions. Any solution, moreover, is complicated by the relative 
lack of institutional options available: while Congress can clarify, 
amend, or repeal a federal statute variously interpreted by circuits, 
only the Court can definitively resolve a constitutional conflict.28 As 
repeated failed reform efforts over the past several decades make 
clear, however, the Court is remarkably successful in neutralizing 
changes perceived as undercutting its discretionary docket authority 
and supremacy. Mindful of this reality, Part IV urges resuscitation by 
Congress of the federal certification statute, which has long 
empowered circuit courts to certify legal questions to the Court for 
authoritative determination, and proposes several ways in which the 
law can be modified to ensure that the Court fulfills its 
 
 24.  See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23 (2005) (“When 
Americans speak of ‘constitutional law,’ they invariably mean the U.S. Constitution and the 
substantial body of federal judicial decisions construing it.”). Of course, state courts also enjoy 
authority to interpret the Federal Constitution and their decisions can engender disuniformity. 
However, the discussion here is limited to intrafederal judicial disagreement, involving the 
varied judgments of a single sovereign’s courts, which raises a distinct array of concerns. In 
future work, I plan to address the contributing role of state courts. 
 25.  See infra Part 3.B.1 
 26.  See infra Part 3.B.2.  
 27.  See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of 
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2006) (noting that we are witnessing the 
“great disappearing merits docket”); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary 
Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 152 (2010) (characterizing 
recent decline in the Court’s plenary docket as “extraordinary”); Linda Greenhouse, On the Court 
That Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest Mark, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, at A1 (noting 
that the 2008 Term resulted in the fewest number of opinions of any since 1953).  
 28.  See infra notes 311–12 and accompanying text.  
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superintendent role. Doing so, it is hoped, will at once cure the 
difficulties created by splits and reinvigorate a now-decayed but once-
meaningful interactive relationship between the intermediate federal 
courts and the Supreme Court that oversees them. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR EMPIRICAL WORK 
Federal judicial power, as Article III provides, is vested in “one 
supreme Court” and such “inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”29 Acting on its prerogative, 
Congress in 1789 created a network of thirteen district courts to 
preside over trials and three circuit courts (Eastern, Southern, and 
Middle) to handle a hybrid docket of trial and appellate matters.30 
Congress refrained from designating judges for the circuit courts, 
instead directing that they be staffed by “any two justices of the 
Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts.”31 In 1802, the 
number of circuits was expanded to six, each again consisting of 
Justices and district court judges.32 Later, in 1869, a circuit judge was 
assigned to each circuit, with the two other judges on the three-
member panels drawn from among the district court judges and 
Supreme Court Justices.33 With the change and concomitant 
stabilization of the previously shifting geographic boundaries of 
circuits, as Erwin Surrency has noted, “[T]he circuits took on a new 
significance.”34 
Not until 1891, however, with the enactment of the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals Act (Evarts Act),35 did the modern federal judicial 
system take shape. The two-tier system was modified to include a 
third, intermediate tier of courts designated to hear appeals, 
replicating the geographic regions of then-extant circuits.36 The 
circuits, for the first time assuming distinct, formalized status, were 
looked upon as a mechanism to relieve the heavy appellate burden of 
the Supreme Court and lend reasoned consistency to federal law in the 
growing nation. Yet, from the outset, creation of an intermediate tier 
 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 30.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75; see also ERWIN C. SURRENCY, 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 21–27 (1987).  
 31.  § 4, 1 Stat. at 74.  
 32.  Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 21, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58.  
 33.  Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44–45.  
 34.  SURRENCY, supra note 30, at 40. 
 35.  The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.  
 36.  Id. § 2.  
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of federal appellate courts prompted worry, including from the bill’s 
sponsor, New York Senator William Evarts, that “diverse tribunals in 
geographical distribution” would sow confusion in “all that we had 
secured heretofore by a uniformity of conclusions.”37 
Subsequent experience amply supported Senator Evart’s 
concern. While expected to seek intracircuit uniformity,38 federal 
intermediate courts were not required to respect or defer to positions 
taken by other circuits.39 As a result, independently derived “law of 
the circuit”—largely insulated from reconciliation due to what was 
seen as the Supreme Court’s excessive docket40—prompted concern.41 
In time, decisional disuniformity among the federal circuits 
prompted creation of several high-profile study groups and 
commissions comprised of prominent jurists, policymakers, 
practitioners, and academics.42 Of the major initiatives, two in 
 
 37.  21 CONG. REC. S10221 (Sept. 19, 1890) (statement of Sen. Evarts); see also, e.g., 21 
CONG. REC. 3407–08 (1890) (comment of Rep. Breckenridge) (expressing concern over “diversities 
of judgment”).  
 38.  See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that later 
panels are “firmly bound” by decisions of earlier panels and referring to the requirement as the 
“law-of-the-circuit” doctrine); see also Stephen L. Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States 
Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 
(1979).  
 39.  Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900); see also Laurie R. 
Wallach, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95 YALE L.J. 
1500, 1500 (1986) (“Circuits lack the executive and legislative attributes of sovereignty that 
make jurisdictional boundaries meaningful; yet, though they are merely arms of a single 
sovereign, they enjoy independence from one another when interpreting federal law . . . . 
[C]ircuits [are] something ‘less’ sovereign than states but ‘more’ than mere coordinate courts . . . 
.”). 
 40.  See Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 
445–46 (1983) (contending that a “clear majority” of Justices felt that “something must be done” 
about Court’s caseload); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The 
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 580 (1969) (“The 
‘law of the circuit’ has emerged as a response to the Supreme Court’s incapacity to resolve 
intercircuit conflicts.”). At least one commentator, however, offered that the Court’s docket 
selection choices, including unimportant cases, and penchant for plurality opinions, belied 
assertions of excessive caseload. See Arthur D. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional 
Capacity: Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28, 32–34 (1983).  
 41.  See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 40, at 596 (condemning “the instability of intercircuit 
conflicts produced by the balkanized system of separate circuits”); Erwin Griswold, Rationing 
Justice—The Supreme Court’s Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 
335, 342 (1974) (observing that “sharply rationed review” by the Supreme Court means “it is 
hard to say that there is any national law on many subjects”); Shirley Hufstedter, Courtship and 
Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A. J. 545, 546–47 (1974) (lamenting the “lack of certitude” in national 
law due to insufficient “ironing out” of “wrinkles”). 
 42.  See ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, 4 APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975 (Paul 
Carrington et al. eds., 1975); AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968); COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., 
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particular stand out. The first, headed by Senator Roman Hruska of 
Nebraska, issued its final report in 1975 and drew attention to the 
“multiplicity” of federal circuits generating “intercircuit conflict” and 
“disharmony.”43 Focusing on a sample of Supreme Court certiorari 
petitions in the 1971 and 1972 terms, the Commission found that at 
least five percent of the cases in which review was denied involved a 
“direct” conflict, a volume equivalent to one-half the total number of 
cases to which the Court actually afforded plenary consideration at 
the time.44 
The Hruska Commission deemed the volume of unresolved 
conflicts “impressive,”45 and expressed its concern that “differences in 
legal rules applied by the same circuits result in unequal treatment of 
citizens . . . solely because of differences in geography.”46 In the face of 
this variability, the Commission urged “creation of a new national 
court of appeals, designed to increase the capacity of the judicial 
system for definitive adjudication of issues of national law.”47 The 
suggestion, however, subjected to sharp criticism by those fearing 
diminished Supreme Court institutional authority and prestige, failed 
to get beyond the stage of congressional hearings.48 
Fifteen years later, a second major congressionally sponsored 
initiative, spearheaded by the Federal Courts Study Committee in 
1990, also addressed circuit conflicts.49 While disavowing the need for 
a national court of appeals, the Study Committee, like the Hruska 
Commission before it, expressed alarm, urging that the Federal 
Judicial Center “study the number and frequency of unresolved 
conflicts” to learn how many were “intolerable,” defined as those: 
“[I]mpos[ing] economic costs or other harm to multi-circuit actors”; 
 
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 
F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]; REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP OF 
THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter FREUND COMMITTEE 
REPORT]. For a helpful overview of the extended series of reform efforts, see Thomas E. Baker, A 
Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals: A Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 395 (2000).  
 43.  HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, at 206–07. 
 44.  Id. at 221–22. 
 45.  Id. at 206–07. 
 46.  Id. at 206–07, 222. 
 47.  Id. at 208. 
 48.  See AM. ENTER. INST., PROPOSALS FOR A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS 27–36 (1977) 
(discussing failure of the Hruska Commission, as well as similar prior effort of the Freund 
Committee); Todd E. Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in the Federal Appellate 
System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 474–81 (1984).  
 49.  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 3 (1990). 
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“encourag[ing] forum shopping among circuits”; 
 “creat[ing] unfairness to litigants in different circuits—for example by allowing federal 
benefits in one circuit that are denied elsewhere”; or 
“encourag[ing] ‘non-acquiescence’ by federal administrative agencies, by forcing them to 
choose between the uniform administration of statutory schemes and obedience to the 
different holdings of courts in different regions.”50 
Accepting the challenge, the Federal Judicial Center appointed 
Professor Arthur Hellman to assess the extent and nature of circuit 
splits. 
Professor Hellman’s study, published in 1995,51 focused on two 
groups of cases in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari52 and 
concluded that the number of unresolved conflicts was larger than 
that suggested by prior research.53 Professor Hellman concluded, 
however, that the splits deemed “intolerable” or “persistent,” based on 
the Federal Judicial Center’s criteria, did not present a problem of 
“serious magnitude.”54 While noting the existence of constitutional 
criminal procedure conflicts,55 and alluding to the “unfairness” of 
varied results,56 the study failed to elaborate on their precise nature or 
ramifications.57 Symptomatic of this, when focusing on a split’s “effect 
on outcome,” a key measure of intolerability,58 Professor Hellman 
omitted discussion of criminal procedure cases.59 He felt free to do so 
because the conflicts would not affect private “multicircuit actors,” 
who would need to adjust their behavior to “different holdings . . . in 
 
 50.  Id. at 124–27. 
 51.  Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved 
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 697 (1995).  
 52.  One group consisted of all cases in which Justice Byron White (well known for his 
concern over unresolved circuit disuniformity) dissented from a denial of certiorari during the 
1988–1990 Terms. Id. at 705. The other group contained a random selection of non–in forma 
pauperis cases in which certiorari was denied during the 1989 Term. Id. at 706. 
 53.  Id. at 772. Professor Hellman acknowledged that focus on Justice White’s dissents 
likely undercounted conflicts because White did not always dissent when certiorari was denied in 
the face of a conflict. Id. at 724.  
 54.  Id. at 797. 
 55.  Id. at 728–29.  
 56.  Id. at 756–57; see also id. at 759–60 (noting that “few of the rules are party neutral” 
and that “because liberty is at stake, concerns about equal treatment will be implicated even 
when the rules regulate only mediate steps in the adjudicative process”).  
 57.  See id. at 749 (noting that some forty percent of the conflicts in the random group and 
more than half of the White dissent group concerned “the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants or the elements of federal crimes”).  
 58.  Id. at 785 (“[T]he key to tolerability is effect on outcomes. Unless the choice between 
the competing rules leads courts to reach divergent results in similar cases, none of the 
consequences that concerned the Study Committee are likely to materialize.”).  
 59.  Id. at 759–60.  
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different regions.”60 Ignoring the effect that circuit disagreement has 
on individual criminal defendants, Professor Hellman observed that 
the federal government—which pursues jurisdiction-specific 
prosecutions—would not be adversely affected.61 
A follow-up study by Professor Hellman, tracking the 
subsequent history of unresolved circuit conflicts in his initial study, 
likewise largely failed to focus on conflicts concerning constitutional 
criminal procedure rights. The study, like that of the Hruska 
Commission,62 singled out as potentially problematic only circuit 
disagreements pertaining to labor and tax law.63 When the study did 
fleetingly focus on criminal procedure disagreements, it similarly 
downplayed their effect on defendants,64 dismissing their importance 
again because the federal government (unlike a business) is not a 
private “multicircuit” actor.65 
II. THE PRESENT STUDY 
As the foregoing suggests, federal circuit splits on 
constitutional doctrine, including criminal procedure, have not gone 
wholly undetected. Nevertheless, researchers, while noting the 
existence of such splits and alluding to the unique problems they 
 
 60.  Id. at 749.  
 61.  Id.  
 62.  HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, at 145–51 (singling out tax as a problem 
area); id. at 154–57 (singling out labor law); see also Carrington, supra note 40, at 611 (labor); 
Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228, 228–29 (1975) (tax).  
 63. Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of 
Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 123–24 (2001) (identifying as the “paradigm of the 
outcome-determinative conflict” varied views on how mutual fund shares in a decedent’s estate 
should be valued for federal tax purposes). Professor Hellman did briefly advert to Fourth 
Amendment conflict but dismissed the significance of the conflict as lacking in practical effect. 
See id. at 125 (noting cases in which “[t]he circuits disagreed over whether a warrantless search 
of an automobile requires exigent circumstances as well as probable cause, but the standard for 
exigency was so undemanding that no search was held unlawful because the requirement was 
not satisfied”).  
 64.  See Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the 
Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 253 (stating that unresolved circuit 
splits would have little impact on criminal defendants); see also id. at 263–64 (noting split 
regarding jury exposure to extrinsic material and right to a new trial but concluding that it was 
not “the dispositive factor in determining case outcomes”). Emblematic of the common research 
emphasis on civil law, Professor Hellman augmented his study with field surveys to get the 
views of practitioners on the practical difficulties and challenges presented by conflicts, singling 
out for attention antitrust, ERISA, labor and employment, and maritime law. Id. at 273–74.  
 65.  Hellman, supra note 63, at 121 n.154.  
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present,66 have failed to systematically chronicle their nature and 
extent. This Part discusses the results of a study intended to remedy 
this empirical deficit, focusing on Fourth Amendment doctrine in 
particular, a domain where circuit splits can have a particularly direct 
effect on individual liberty and privacy. 
A. Findings 
A variety of data sources were consulted. In contrast to prior 
work, which assessed splits in a “top down” fashion by focusing on 
certiorari grants or denials by the Court, the present study adopted a 
“bottom up” approach, focusing on splits that arose among the courts 
of appeals themselves. This strategy allowed for a fuller illumination 
of the splits for several reasons. First, focus on certiorari outcomes 
alone risks underinclusiveness, due to the possibility that certiorari 
was not actually sought or because the split preceded or followed the 
study period. Moreover, and more important, focusing on certiorari 
petitions, which number in the tens of thousands, necessitates resort 
to sampling, which fails to reflect the nature and extent of splits. 
Finally, certiorari-focused studies typically have omitted coverage of 
in forma pauperis petitions, which, while perhaps a sensible means of 
reducing the enormous volume of cases, can adversely skew results in 
the criminal justice context, where impecunious defendants 
predominate and often lack a right to appointed counsel in the 
certiorari process.67 
Here, a Westlaw search was conducted of federal court of 
appeals decisions rendered over a ten-year period (September 1, 2001 
to December 1, 2011),68 augmented by review of the “Split Circuits” 
blog69 and the “Circuit Splits” service of U.S. Law Week,70 as well as 
 
 66.  See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 13, at 549 n.77 (disclaiming focus on circuit constitutional 
disuniformity and stating that “[o]f course, individual rights ought to be protected uniformly 
throughout the country”); Frost, supra note 13, at 1569 n.5 (acknowledging that “varied 
interpretation of federal constitutional law raises different, and arguably more troubling, 
questions”).  
 67.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) (simultaneously granting 
petitioner motion to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari). See generally 
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY 849–51 (9th ed. 2010) (surveying post-trial limits on availability of government-
appointed counsel). 
 68.  The following query was used in the “cta” database (containing all intermediate federal 
court cases): division divide! conflict! split inconsisten! differ! disagree! uncertain! /p “court of 
appeal” circuit “federal court” & fourth “4th amendment” “amend. 4” search seiz!.  
 69.  See A. Benjamin Spencer, SPLIT CIRCUITS, http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2011). 
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the author’s monitoring of Fourth Amendment circuit splits more 
generally. The strategy was designed to yield the fullest, most 
comprehensive picture of splits during the study period. 
The study employed a conservative definition of a split, only 
identifying instances when a court of appeals explicitly acknowledged 
one to be in existence.71 As a result, the study avoided counting 
instances when courts disregarded or engaged in superficial 
distinction of conflicting extracircuit precedent, a not uncommon 
occurrence,72 which if counted would introduce an unhelpful 
definitional uncertainty.73 The study revealed that—at this time74—
more than three dozen splits exist on Fourth Amendment matters in 
the courts of appeals. Appendix A indicates the issues on which the 
courts are split and the dates on which the splits emerged. 
The splits, organized in terms of those relating to general 
search and seizure practices, the applicability and reach of the 
exclusionary rule, and appellate review, concern an array of Fourth 
Amendment issues that regularly arise in federal criminal cases. For 
instance, in terms of search and seizure practices, circuit variation can 
determine whether police can: 
 
 “sweep” a residence when no one is arrested on the 
premises; 
 
 extend the duration of a seizure by asking questions 
unrelated to the basis for the seizure; 
 
 70.  See Split Circuits, USLAW, http://www.uslaw.com/law_blogs/Split+Circuits?blog=47 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2011).  
 71.  An approach like that recently used by Professors George and Solimine. See Tracey E. 
George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals 
En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 188 (2001) (classifying “a case as involving an intercircuit 
split only if any member of the panel explicitly stated that another circuit or circuits had reached 
a different decision in analogous circumstances and if the conflict was express and direct rather 
than merely a matter of general or logical inconsistency”); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking 
the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 922–41 
(1991) (adopting a similar approach).  
 72.  See, e.g., United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2009) (adopting a 
narrow view of whether private actors qualify as government agents, ignoring a contrary position 
adopted by Fourth Circuit in Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 1987)).  
 73.  At the same time, the study excluded federal circuit splits acknowledged by non-circuit 
courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 927 N.E.2d 439, 446–47 (Mass. 2010) (noting 
federal circuit variation on whether police can conduct a protective Terry frisk of an individual 
subject to a consensual encounter, absent reasonable suspicion that the individual is or was 
involved in criminal activity).  
 74.  The study also did not take into account aged but still extant splits that that did not 
manifest during the study period. See infra note 114. 
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 illegally seize an individual and use identity-related 
evidence secured to prosecute the detainee for an 
unrelated crime; 
 
 search an area incident to arrest after the arrestee has 
left the area; 
 
 enter a home without a warrant based on the 
“community caretaking” doctrine; 
 
 seize an individual based on a mistaken understanding 
of substantive law; and 
 
 rely on information that has not been communicated to 
the arresting officer by another officer to justify a search 
or seizure.75 
 
Exclusionary rule variations are no less significant. They can 
also have an outcome-determinative effect—such as in United States 
v. Faulkner, noted at the outset, when police unlawfully detain an 
individual, learn that he is subject to an outstanding arrest warrant, 
and then arrest and search him, resulting in discovery of evidence 
leading to an unrelated criminal prosecution.76 Likewise, circuit-level 
disagreement can affect whether a defendant has standing to 
challenge police action, such as when a rental car is searched and the 
driver is operating the car with the renter’s permission but does not 
appear on the rental agreement.77 Finally, circuit disagreement on 
appellate standards of review can have significant impact. It can, for 
instance, determine how much deference is owed lower court 
assessments of protectable curtilage around a home and the scope of 
consent provided by a defendant in a search.78 
 
 75.  See infra Appendix A.  
 76.  See infra Appendix A. 
 77.  See infra Appendix A. 
 78.  See infra Appendix A. 
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B. Assessing Intolerability and Persistence 
The intercircuit variation highlighted here is problematic in 
terms of both measures employed by prior research: intolerability and 
persistence.79 
1. Intolerability 
As a consequence of the variation, the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”80 is allowed to 
hinge on geographic happenstance,81 resulting in varied protection 
against infringements on individuals’ privacy and physical liberty 
(both immediate, as the result of a particular seizure, and long term, 
as a result of imprisonment).82 Two examples of the many instances of 
circuit disuniformity uncovered here highlight the impact of this 
variability. 
A first example concerns the authority of police to search 
incident to a lawful arrest, one of the most commonly invoked 
exceptions to the default expectation that police secure a warrant 
before searching a person or property.83 Police have long possessed 
 
 79. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.  
 80. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 81. Whether the Fourth Amendment ensures a collective or individual right of privacy and 
bodily security has long been the source of debate. See, e.g., Donald L. Dorenberg, The Right of 
the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 282–83 (1983) (noting contrast between the Court’s view of the exclusionary 
rule as serving the collective interest in deterring police misconduct (versus vindicating 
individual rights), and its approach to standing, which is conditioned on whether an individual 
has a right to contest a search or seizure). The circuit splits identified here, however, implicate 
the distinct question of rights being available to some but not other “people,” based not on 
personal circumstance but rather on specific geographic location within the larger national 
political community. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“ ‘[T]he 
people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution . . . . [Its 
use] suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community . . . .”).  
 82.  The doctrinal variation, moreover, is not always dichotomous in form. While circuits 
most often divide into two jurisprudential camps, they can also reflect three or more approaches 
to a particular issue, magnifying the nature and scope of variation. Multicircuit splits exist, for 
example, on the issue of the definition of “reason to believe” sufficient to justify entering the 
home of the target of an arrest warrant, see United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262–63 (4th Cir. 
2011); the standard used to assess whether police would have inevitably discovered challenged 
evidence in the absence of an unlawful search, see United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 640 
n.24 (7th Cir. 2009); and whether an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle, driving with the 
permission of the renter, has standing to challenge a vehicle search, see United States v. 
Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1196–99 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 83.  See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(b) (4th ed. 2004) (noting that only 
consensual searches exceed in volume searches incident to arrest). 
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search incident authority,84 allowing them to remove any weapons or 
evidence possessed by the arrestee.85 Over time, however, the 
parameters of the authority have been disputed. In its seminal 1969 
decision Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court held in the context 
of an in-house arrest that police can search an arrestee’s area of 
“immediate control,” including the “area into which the arrestee might 
reach.”86 Twelve years later, in Belton v. New York, a case involving 
the arrest of a motorist, the Court expanded the right in an important 
way, while professing to merely apply Chimel to the “particular and 
problematic context” of auto searches.87 The Belton Court afforded 
police a per se right to search an auto’s passenger compartment and 
any containers found therein,88 expanding police search authority to 
areas often beyond the actual physical reach of arrestees.89 
Notwithstanding Belton’s limiting language, several circuits—
including the Fourth,90 Fifth,91 Seventh,92 Eighth,93 and D.C. 
Circuits94—have applied Belton beyond the auto search context, while 
others—such as the Third95—adhere to Chimel’s focus on whether an 
area searched was actually within the “grab area” of an arrestee. As a 
result, whether police can search an area depends on the circuit in 
which an arrest occurs. If an arrest occurs in a circuit affording police 
greater authority, a search is permitted even if the arrestee is 
handcuffed, or otherwise safely constrained by police, and can extend 
 
 84.  See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search 
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 385–90 (2001).  
 85.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
 86.  Id. at 763. 
 87.  453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981).  
 88.  Id. at 460.  
 89.  See id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority “adopt[ed] a 
fiction—that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has 
recently been in the car”).  
 90.  United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984).  
 91.  United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 281–82 (5th Cir. 1988).  
 92.  United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 93.  United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1984).  
 94.  United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 95.  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 268–74 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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to areas from which the arrestee has been removed.96 If not in such a 
circuit, a search will be deemed invalid as beyond Chimel’s scope.97 
To make matters worse, search incident to arrest doctrine has 
been further muddied as a result of the Court’s 2009 decision in 
Arizona v. Gant.98 An auto search case, Gant held that Chimel 
“authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”99 In 
the wake of Gant, the circuits have disagreed over whether the Gant 
majority’s more circumscribed view of police authority applies beyond 
the auto context, with the Supreme Court failing to resolve the 
uncertainty.100 
Another illustration of the troubling impact of circuit 
disuniformity concerns whether police should be permitted to make 
reasonable mistakes as to the scope and meaning of the laws they 
invoke when they seize individuals. While historically such mistakes 
were uniformly condemned, triggering first tort liability and later 
application of the exclusionary rule, based on the finding that any 
such seizure was unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes,101 
recent years have witnessed a weakening of the strict rule. Indeed, 
today in the Eighth Circuit102 police are forgiven for their “objectively 
reasonable” mistakes of substantive law, a position at direct odds with 
every other circuit addressing the issue.103 
 
 96.  See, e.g., United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[O]fficers may 
separate the suspect from the item to be searched . . . before they conduct the search.”); Abdul-
Saboor, 85 F.3d at 670–71 (determining that search of apartment was a lawful search incident to 
arrest when the suspect was handcuffed during the search).  
 97.  See, e.g., Myers, 308 F.3d at 267 (invalidating search when arrestee was handcuffed, 
lying face down on the floor, and monitored by two police officers); LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 6.3 
n.40 (citing Myers and similar cases). 
 98.  556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
 99.  Id. at 343. The Gant majority also identified an alternate basis to justify a search 
incident to arrest, expressly limited (for reasons that remain obscure) to the auto context: when 
it is “reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 346. 
 100.  See Jamie L. Starbuck, Comment, Redefining Searches Incident to Arrest: Gant’s Effect 
on Chimel, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2012) (“Parties in seventeen different search 
incident to arrest cases over time have filed for certiorari; the Supreme Court has denied each 
petition.”).  
 101.  Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 70 (2011). 
 102.  E.g., United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 103.  See, e.g., United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Stops premised on a 
mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be 
unconstitutional.”); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) ("A stop based 
on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not 
objectively reasonable.”); United States v. Tibbets, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) 
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As a consequence, individuals within the boundaries of the 
Eighth Circuit can be detained by police on the mistaken belief that 
their behavior is unlawful, and not only will the seizure be condoned, 
but any evidence or information secured by police as a result of the 
seizure can be used because the exclusionary rule is not at play.104 
Thus, police in the Eighth Circuit, as in the other circuits, not only can 
make reasonable mistakes of fact, giving rise to probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion resulting in a seizure.105 They can also, unlike 
police in other circuits, engage in lawless seizures (and hence 
searches) with impunity. Affording law enforcement such latitude not 
only raises obvious rule of law concerns.106 It also has major practical 
implications given the predisposition of modern police to use minor 
offenses, often of a highly technical, malum prohibitum nature, as 
bases to seize individuals and secure evidence in support of more 
serious reasons for prosecution.107 
The foregoing examples, just two of the many splits unearthed 
here, fail, however, to convey the broader impact of disuniformity. 
This is because the interests receiving variable protection are 
intended to protect the innocent and guilty alike.108 Because the 
exclusionary rule dominates attention and discourse, it is often 
overlooked that police authority governs situations when individuals 
attracting law enforcement attention are doing nothing whatsoever 
wrong.109 Moreover, while it seems unlikely that individuals will often 
conduct their lives based on the availability or nonavailability of 
Fourth Amendment rights, the possibility exists. For example, ex ante 
personal behavior might be affected by a circuit position on the right 
 
(“[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively 
reasonable.”); United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[An officer’s] belief 
based on a mistaken understanding of the law cannot constitute the reasonable suspicion 
required for a constitutional traffic stop.”).  
 104.  See, e.g., Martin, 411 F.3d at 1000–02 (upholding admission of evidence seized as a 
result of an auto stop based on officer’s misunderstanding of traffic law).  
 105.  See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n 
officer’s mistaken assessment of facts need not render his actions unreasonable because what is 
reasonable will be completely dependent on the specific and usually unique circumstances 
presented by each case.”).  
 106.  See Logan, supra note 101, at 90–95. 
 107.  See Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1247–
48 (2010) (discussing use of traffic stops to secure evidence in support of more serious 
prosecutions).  
 108.  See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the 
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1229–31 (1983). 
 109. A prime example is found in recent data from New York City where the overwhelming 
majority of persons stopped, questioned, and frisked by police in 2006 were not ultimately 
arrested. See Logan, supra note 101, at 103 n.228.  
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of a rental car driver to contest a search; the right of a nonpresent 
resident to rely on a prior denial of consent to prevent entry of her 
home by police; or the privacy expectation of a prisoner in his mail.110 
In the face of such legal uncertainty, individuals cannot “know the 
scope of [their] constitutional protection.”111 
In short, whatever the merit of other researchers’ tendency to 
dismiss the significance of splits in the civil nonconstitutional 
realm,112 the consequences of the doctrinal variation highlighted 
here—accounting for what one circuit judge called an “appreciable 
entropy among the circuits”113—warrant the opposite conclusion. 
2. Persistence 
The persistence of Fourth Amendment circuit splits uncovered 
here raises additional concern. As noted in Appendix A, while most 
splits are of relatively recent vintage, many have endured for years, 
with eight splits dating back to the 1990s, and one to the 1980s,114 
betraying the Court’s purported preference to act when faced with 
“deep splits.”115 The varied circuit positions not only result in 
 
 110.  For discussion of how Fourth Amendment doctrine can affect the daily life and 
behaviors of individuals more generally, see L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment 
and the Duties of Law-Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1521–26 (2011). 
 111.  See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981). While such uncertainty is most 
acute in instances involving police-citizen interactions at circuit borders, splits also affect 
outcomes in other instances, such as when a circuit lacks precedent on an issue. See infra Part 
3.A.2.  
 112.  See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.  
 113.  United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kethledge, J., dissenting). 
 114.  Again, the conservative methodology used here offers a mere snapshot of extant splits, 
excluding, for instance, consideration of splits that did not manifest in the study period. For 
example, a split exists over whether police have a per se right to frisk the companion of an 
arrestee. See United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting disagreement with 
United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971)). While recent decisions such as Arizona 
v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), emphasize the need for individualized suspicion of a weapon 
being present to justify a Terry frisk, the “automatic companion” split continues to be recognized. 
E.g., Glantz v. Ren, No. CV 09-149-M-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 4286234, at *8 n.7 (D. Mont. Sept. 16, 
2010). A split also exists on whether one has an expectation of privacy regarding packages 
addressed to an alias. United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1062–64 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(denying expectation) and United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing 
expectation)).  
 115.  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
517, 517 (2003) (“For the most part, the Supreme Court will consider for review only cases 
presenting what we call deep splits—questions on which other courts . . . have strongly 
disagreed.”); id. at 521 (“[W]e take cases . . . to resolve strong disagreements—splits not likely to 
heal . . . . [A]bout 70 percent of the cases we agree to hear involve deep divisions of opinion 
among federal courts of appeals or state high courts.”).  
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accumulated individual-level differences in search and seizure 
outcomes over time.116 They also have negative systemic effects, 
including relative to resources, as courts and litigants are required to 
address unsettled questions of law.117 
With respect to persistence, it should not go unacknowledged 
that the Court did see fit to resolve several splits arising during the 
study period,118 and agreed to address several others in its October 
2011 Term.119 However, as noted earlier and more fully set forth in 
Appendix A, multiple splits persist, along with their negative 
consequences. 
C. The Data in Context 
The findings presented here cannot be decoupled from the 
broader context in which they arise. Indeed, some degree of variation 
can be thought inevitable given the nation’s network of circuit 
courts,120 which Judge Posner has aptly characterized as constituting 
 
 116. Moreover, the negative impact of the variability is exacerbated by the existence of 
multiple circuit positions on particular Fourth Amendment issues. See supra note 82.  
 117.  For a discussion of the costs associated with such uncertainty by a Senior Second 
Circuit Judge, see Roger J. Miner, Federal Court Reform Should Start at the Top, 77 JUDICATURE 
104, 106–07 (1993) (“Where the Supreme Court has not spoken on an issue, but some circuits 
have resolved the question in one way and some in another, litigation is encouraged in those 
circuits that have not yet spoken.”); id. at 107 (“Aside from the fact that fairness is lost and 
justice is not seen to be done, the lower courts become clogged with cases that would not be 
brought if the law was clearly stated.”). 
 118.  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–25 (2011) (addressing whether 
the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule applies to officer reliance on settled case  law); 
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95 (2005) (determining whether police can ask a detainee 
questions unrelated to the basis for detention, not resulting in seizure delay); Devenpeck v. 
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 148, 155–56 (2004) (addressing whether, when police arrest on a legally 
invalid basis, an alternate legal (yet unarticulated) basis must be “closely related”). 
 119. See Huff v. City of Burbank, 632 F.3d 539, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting and rejecting 
position of other circuits that emergency and exigency doctrines for warrantless police entries of 
residences are not distinct), cert. granted sub nom. Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012); United 
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556, 563–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting split on whether attaching 
global positioning device to car and tracking it for extended period implicates Fourth 
Amendment, and determining that they do), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 
S. Ct. 3064 (2011); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 298–99, 
311 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting split on permissibility of suspicionless strip searches of minor offense 
arrestees and determining that they are permissible), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). The 
Court also agreed to resolve a split in its coming October 2012 Term, dating back to the early 
1990s, concerning whether police executing a search warrant can lawfully detain a person 
located some distance away from the targeted search premises. See United States v. Bailey, 652 
F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting split among five other circuits on the question), cert. granted 
Bailey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2710 (2012). 
 120. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990) (noting the “inconsistency . . . which a 
multimembered, multi-tiered federal judicial system . . . creates”). 
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“at best a loose confederacy.”121 Circuit panels, as noted earlier, need 
only decide in a manner ensuring intracircuit jurisprudential 
uniformity.122 At the same time, consistent with Supreme Court 
license,123 circuit judges do not view creation of a conflict as a 
paramount detriment in their decisionmaking124 and as a general 
matter act autonomously, not as agents of the Supreme Court relative 
to unsettled issues.125  
Certainly no less important, the splits must be conceived in 
terms of the judicial process from which they emanate and their legal 
subject matter. With respect to the former, as Marbury teaches, 
judicial interpretation, even of constitutional text, unavoidably affords 
some intellectual rein.126 So too does the interpretation of frequently 
opaque and open-ended Supreme Court precedent,127 complemented 
by the modern Court’s preference for narrower, minimalist holdings.128 
The upshot, as political scientist David Klein has found, is that 
“[c]ircuit judges are given numerous chances to make law unimpeded 
by the Supreme Court, and they seem to take advantage of these 
opportunities. . . . [M]uch of the federal law in any circuit looks as it 
does because court of appeals judges think it should look that way.”129 
 
 121. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 380 (1996).  
 122.  See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
 123. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) (“Comity is not a rule 
of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy 
. . . . But its obligation is not imperative. If it were, the indiscreet action of one court might 
become a precedent, increasing in weight with each successive adjudication, until the whole 
country was tied down to an unsound principle.”); see also id. (averring that judges should do 
what they think is “right”).  
 124.  See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 22–25 
(2002) (discussing results of circuit judge survey identifying intercircuit uniformity as being of 
least importance among several goals in decisionmaking). But see Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit 
Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REV. 119, 123–24, 129 (2002) (concluding, based 
on a study of Ninth Circuit case files, that “appellate judges take seriously the charge to reduce 
or minimize . . . conflicts before they reach the Supreme Court”).  
 125.  E.g., KLEIN, supra note 124, at 126–27, 134; Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 512 (2008).  
 126. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule 
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).  
 127. See Evan H. Caminiker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1994) (“Deciding what a precedent 
means will frequently depend on the particular normative values and assumptions each judge 
brings to the interpretive enterprise.”). 
 128.  See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 
1041–42 (2010) (“The Justices understand that they are setting rules for a diverse nation . . . and 
that it is normally better not to decide more than is necessary for the satisfactory disposition of 
the case at hand.”). On the purported virtues of the shift, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A 
TIME (2001).  
 129.  KLEIN, supra note 124, at 135.  
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Fourth Amendment doctrine amply lends itself to such 
interstitial judicial lawmaking. The Amendment’s text broadly 
proscribes “unreasonable” searches and seizures130 and contains two 
clauses that the Supreme Court has long failed to clarify whether and 
how are related to one another.131 And even though the Court has 
often announced its fealty to “bright-line” Fourth Amendment rules, 
the multifarious circumstances of law enforcement make consistent 
rulemaking and application difficult.132 
The foregoing observations, however, lack explanatory force 
here. The splits documented do not turn on idiosyncratic, often 
nonrecurrent particular factual scenarios, such as whether police use 
of force was excessive133 or the existence of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.134 Rather, they reflect basic doctrinal differences 
among the circuits on matters concerning the search and seizure 
authority of police, applicability of the exclusionary rule, and appellate 
standards of review. 
At the same time, the splits, in their nature and extent, are 
surprising given what we know about the current federal judiciary. 
From trial courts up through the Supreme Court, the federal bench is 
more conservative than in preceding decades, bearing the 
predominant imprint of appointees of Republican Presidents Ronald 
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush.135 Given that 
conservatives (at least those of nonlibertarian ilk) have long 
disfavored generous readings of the Fourth Amendment and the 
 
 130.  See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“Because of the necessarily ad hoc 
nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law which will 
decide every case.”); cf. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in 
Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (1990) (discussing constitutional indeterminacy more 
generally). 
 131.  See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 67, at 32 (noting Court’s varied treatment of the 
Amendment’s reasonableness and warrant clauses). 
 132.  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (acknowledging the “protean variety of the 
street encounter”).  
 133.  See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (recognizing the common need for 
courts to “slosh [their] way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’ ” in such claims).  
 134.  See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–76 (2002) (noting the need for 
courts in assessing reasonable suspicion to consider the “totality of the circumstances,” based on 
particular facts of situations and officers’ specialized training).  
 135.  See Corey R. Yung, Judged By the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the 
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1181–82 
(2010).  
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exclusionary rule,136 one would think that the disputes demonstrated 
here would not regularly arise.137 
At least a partial explanation perhaps lies in the 
microcomposition of panels deciding cases. Under current rules, a 
three-judge panel in a given circuit, perhaps composed of two or more 
civil rights-generous judges138 voting “first in time” can create the law 
of the circuit.139 Moreover, given the rarity of en banc 
reconsideration,140 even in the acknowledged face of a split,141 such 
outcomes can enjoy staying power.142 
Whatever the etiology of the splits, we are still left with the 
curious failure of the Supreme Court to resolve them. In light of the 
increasing conservatism of the Court, which has all but done away 
with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,143 logic would suggest 
 
 136.  See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 111 
(2003) (“To conservatives, [the exclusionary rule] is an absurd rule through which manifestly 
dangerous criminals are let out because the courts prefer technicalities to truth.”).  
 137.  Indeed, Justice Souter, in seeking to explain the Court’s modest modern-day caseload, 
reasoned that the circuits have become more politically homogeneous as a result of presidential 
appointments, resulting in fewer splits for the Court to resolve. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 
146.  
 138.  See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he first panel to 
consider an issue sets the law not only for all the inferior courts in the circuit, but also future 
panels of the court of appeals.”); see also Arthur D. Hellman, “The Law of the Circuit” Revisited: 
What Role for Majority Rule?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 625, 625 (2008) (noting that “binding circuit law 
can be established by a panel whose views do not represent the views of a majority of the circuit’s 
active judges”).  
 139.  As Professor Frank Cross has observed, this is so even though, as a technical matter, 
circuits enjoy the power to reverse earlier precedent. See CROSS, supra note 12, at 203–04.  
 140.  See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: 
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1338 n.71 (2009) (citing 
studies showing that the likelihood of a court hearing a case en banc is considerably less than 
one percent); see also CROSS, supra note 12, at 108–09 (noting deterrents (including added 
decisionmaking burdens) and the negative impact on collegiality associated with reviewing and 
reversing one’s colleagues). In addition, it appears that rates of en banc review are even lower in 
the criminal litigation context. Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and 
the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 754–55 
(2009).  
 141.  While Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(b)(1)(B) suggests that a split may 
warrant attention in considering a petition for en banc hearing, such hearings do not appear to 
occur in significant part due to splits. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of 
the Decision To Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 219–20 (1999).  
 142.  See Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 1019 
(2012) (“[Stare decisis] doctrine is severe indeed. It prohibits reexamination of the first panel’s 
precedent even in light of subsequent insights from other circuits.”).  
 143.  See Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191, 200–07 (2010) (discussing an array of limits imposed on the 
exclusionary rule during the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts); see also Frank Cross et al., A 
Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 ILL. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (noting pre-
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that it would eagerly seize opportunities to reexamine and reject any 
prodefendant outcomes from inferior courts.144 While in past decades 
the Justices perhaps could be expected to resolve splits,145 the results 
reported on here make clear that this is not the case today.146 And 
when the Court does get around to deciding a contested issue, many 
years can pass first, with negative consequences continuing to accrue 
in the interim.147 
III. QUESTIONING CONFORMITY: NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
Whether circuit-level variation on federal law in general is 
problematic has been the subject of lively debate over the years. In 
1983, for instance, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Clifford 
 
appointment memoranda of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito expressing their desire to 
abolish the exclusionary rule). 
 144.  “Aggressive grants,” in political science parlance. H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO 
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 207–12 (1991); see also 
JEFFREY SEGAL & HOWARD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 319 (2002) (showing a close association between Justices’ ideologies and their 
exclusionary rule votes).  
 145.  See RICHARD F. WOLFSON & PHILIP B. KURLAND, ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM JURISDICTION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 322 (2d ed. 1951) (“Where the decision of the 
Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed by certiorari directly conflicts . . . with the decision of 
another Court of Appeals on the same question, the Supreme Court grants certiorari as matter of 
course, and irrespective of the importance of the question of law involved.”). But see Robert L. 
Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465, 470–72 (1953) (stating that 
the Court did not automatically reconcile splits at the time but that one would “usually be 
sufficient” for certiorari to be granted). 
 146.  The Court’s institutional inertia, it is important to note, goes unremedied by the Office 
of the Solicitor General, an entity theoretically (yet arguably, given its executive branch status) 
capable of serving as a superintendent of clarity in national law. See generally Michael W. 
McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105 
(1988); David R. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1998). As recent work has shown, however, the Office has aligned itself 
with the Court’s abstemious preferences and significantly reduced the volume of its certiorari 
recommendations, which have enjoyed a historically high rate of success. See Margaret 
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme 
Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1333–34, 1338–39 (2010); see also Linda R. Cohen & 
Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 391, 395–96 (2000) (arguing that the selectivity of the Office significantly alters the 
Court’s plenary docket relative to circuit cases lost by the government). For argument favoring 
more zealous advocacy on the part of the Office at the petition stage, see Adam H. Chandler, 
Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121 
YALE L.J. 725 (2011).  
 147.  See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982) (noting, in an era when the 
Court heard many more cases, that “years may pass before the Court finally invalidates a police 
practice of dubious constitutionality”). 
1b. Logan_Ready for PAGE(Do Not Delete) 10/18/2012  8:06 AM 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL CACOPHONY 1161 
Wallace, while noting that “[i]deally” interpretations of federal law 
would be uniform, wrote that it was “not clear that there is anything 
intrinsically unacceptable about conflicts.”148 “Indeed,” Judge Wallace 
continued, “if conflicts were by their very nature unacceptable, the 
traditional rule denying precedential status to out-of-circuit decisions 
probably would not have enjoyed its long history.”149 More recently, 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Harvie Wilkinson downplayed 
the impact of intercircuit conflict, asserting that the “problems of 
disuniformity are very much overstated”150 and that the “world will 
not end because a few circuit splits are left unresolved.”151 Along these 
same lines, Professor Amanda Frost, reflecting on varied circuit court 
interpretations of federal civil statutes and regulations, has concluded 
that uniformity is often “overvalu[ed]”152 and that disuniformity can 
even be beneficial.153 
This Part considers whether the foregoing views are warranted 
in light of the findings highlighted here regarding federal 
constitutional doctrine. Earlier the point was made that on the 
“intolerability” measure Fourth Amendment splits have distinct and 
more troublesome outcomes than those encountered in the civil, 
nonconstitutional law context.154 The splits also “persist,” resulting in 
continued disparate outcomes.155 The following discussion examines 
the unique difficulties presented by Fourth Amendment splits, first by 
situating the study’s findings in the more general debate over whether 
splits are problematic, and then by assessing several distinct 
normative and practical problems that the splits present.  
A. Reasons Traditionally Advanced in Favor of Tolerating Splits 
1. Laboratories of Regional Experimentation 
Commentators have advanced a variety of arguments in 
support of the view that circuit splits are not only unproblematic but 
can actually have salutary effect. Perhaps most significant has been 
the argument that splits allow for experimentation, providing a 
 
 148.  J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed 
for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 923, 929 (1983).  
 149.  Id. at 929. 
 150.  Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 69.  
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Frost, supra note 13, at 1639.  
 153.  Id. at 1571, 1606.  
 154.  See supra Part II.B.1.  
 155.  See supra Part II.B.2.  
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benefit akin to that famously envisioned by Justice Brandeis vis-à-vis 
state policy preferences.156 According to Judge Wallace, circuit-level 
variation permits courts to experiment in ways aligned with the needs 
and preferences of their geographic domains. “[T]he very diversity of 
our vast country, with its many regional differences and local needs,” 
Judge Wallace asserted, “logically supports a flexible system that can 
benefit, when appropriate, from federal law which takes account of 
these regional variations (e.g., in fields such as water rights).”157 Along 
these same lines, political scientist Jennifer Luse and her colleagues 
contend that such variations reflect and lend normative significance to 
the nation’s federalist structure. The geographical organization of the 
circuits is: 
[N]o mere artifact of history but reflects the tension between advocates of increased 
national power and those who favored devolution of authority to the state and local 
level. Although these courts may seek to contribute to uniformity in federal law, “The 
task to which the courts of appeals have called themselves is that of making the 
national law as applied to their geographic territories.” That is, they attempt to balance 
uniformity with necessary regional adaptation, which is reflected (albeit imperfectly) in 
the decisions they issue.158 
Whatever their merit more generally, such arguments lack 
persuasive force here for several reasons. First and foremost, 
constitutional rights differ from the typical subject of Brandeisian 
experimentation, the “fields of social and economic science.”159 As the 
Court itself has insisted, rights are not the proper subject of 
experimentation.160 And even if they were, the modus operandi of the 
 
 156.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 157.  Wallace, supra note 148, at 930; see also J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF 
APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 81 (1981) (“[T]he quest for uniformity contains room for regional 
experimentation and adaptation of national law to continental diversity.”).  
 158.  Jennifer K. Luse et al., “Such Inferior Courts…”: Compliance by Circuits with 
Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75, 77–78 (2009) (citation omitted).  
 159.  New State Ice Co., 285 U.S at 310–11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 160.  See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitution was  
intended—its very purpose was—to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the 
individual.”). A similar view was voiced by Justice Goldberg several decades later:  
While I quite agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis that a “State may . . . serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments,” I do not believe that this 
includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . . I 
cannot agree that the Constitution grants such power either to the States or to the 
Federal Government.  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted);  
see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 312 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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experimentation differs from the Brandeisian model. With the latter, 
the effects of policy choices are cabined to single states;161 circuit 
positions, on the other hand, by definition influence rights across 
several states, affecting far more individuals.162 
It is also difficult to imagine any attendant sorting benefit, 
championed by devolutionary federalism proponents more generally, 
who posit based on Charles Tiebout’s influential thesis163 that citizens 
will “vote with their feet” and allow identification of optimal policy.164 
Even assuming, as Tiebout did relative to local public goods, that 
individuals are fully informed of variant policies,165 Fourth 
Amendment rights are ill-suited to the analysis. It is highly unlikely 
that a circuit’s position on a particular Fourth Amendment question, 
whether restrictive or generous, would drive the major life-affecting 
decision to move, even among the most law-and-order or civil liberty-
oriented individuals.166 Exit likelihood, moreover, is further 
diminished given that U.S. mobility is overwhelmingly intrastate in 
 
(“Communities vary . . . in many respects . . . and such variances have never been considered to 
require or justify a varying standard for application of the Federal Constitution . . . . It is, after 
all, a national Constitution we are expounding.” (citations omitted)).  
 161.  See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (lauding “experiments” 
undertaken “without risk to the rest of the country”). At the same time, serious question remains 
over whether varied state policies and practices actually function as anything like experiments. 
See Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 947 (2011) (“The 
difficulties that social scientists and especially policymakers face in assessing the results of state 
innovations contribute to the inaptness of the states-as-laboratories metaphor.”); Edward L. 
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 
923–26 (1994) (questioning whether states can actually serve as laboratories of 
experimentation).  
 162.  Circuit precedent can also affect outcomes in unexpected contexts. For instance, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals generally applies the law of the circuit in which a case arises. See 
Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings: Where It Was, Where It Is, 
Where It May Be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 53, 86 (2010). In state courts, federal rights 
claims can be controlled or at least influenced by the law of the circuit in which they are located. 
See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 719, 761 (2010). Finally, as discussed later, the practical effect of a circuit adopting a 
position can extend well beyond that circuit, affecting rights of individuals who find themselves 
criminally prosecuted in another circuit. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 163.  See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 416 (1956) (discussing a model that “yields a solution for the level of expenditures for 
local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population more adequately than they can 
be reflected at the national level”). 
 164.  See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 127–29 (2000). On 
exit more generally, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21–29 (1970).  
 165.  Tiebout, supra note 163, at 419.  
 166.  For examples of the expansive literature critiquing Tiebout’s model on similar grounds, 
see, for example, Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine , 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 515–17 (1991). 
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nature.167 One would need to change state residence and perhaps even 
cross several states’ boundaries to satisfy a doctrinal preference.168 
Furthermore, there is reason to question whether the varied 
Fourth Amendment positions noted here reflect distinct geographic 
preferences worthy of deference. Most obvious, purported geographic 
representativeness is significantly undercut by the common 
occurrence of judges (whether trial or appellate) from other circuits 
sitting by designation on three-judge panels with precedential 
authority.169 Moreover, while something might be said in favor of the 
geographic voice of federal trial courts,170 many circuits can scarcely 
be characterized as region based. For example, the Sixth Circuit 
contains states from the upper Midwest (Michigan) and the South 
(Tennessee); the First Circuit contains New England states 
(Massachusetts and Maine) and Puerto Rico. And, even if circuits were 
comprised of more cohesive sociocultural regions, it is not clear that 
they would manifest distinctiveness, given the nation’s ongoing 
homogenization.171 Indeed, to the extent geographic differences exist, 
they would most likely be evident at the more granular level of urban 
versus rural jurisdictions, a distinction operative in all circuits. 
Findings of political scientists on the federal appellate process 
itself further undercut the premise of regionalism. A rich literature 
exists on factors found to influence judicial decisionmaking—including 
ideology,172 legal formalism,173 strategic institutional goals (e.g., career 
 
 167.  See Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 489–90 (2004). 
 168.  Id. at 502 (noting personal factors militating against interstate moves and commenting 
that “our lives are too multi-dimensional to suppose that our regulatory preferences always will 
play a decisive role”); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional 
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1606–07 (2005) (discussing why smaller polities have smaller 
exit costs). That Fourth Amendment rights might be thought to disproportionately affect the 
poor, lacking in relative mobility wherewithal yet the common focus of street-level policing, 
further undercuts reason to think that foot-voting will be operative. See Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420–21 (1990) (noting 
that mobility “is constrained by a variety of economic factors that tend to affect poorer people 
more than affluent ones”). 
 169.  See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to the Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional 
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 605 (1989) (“In the [Courts of 
Appeals], there are numerous judges sitting in constantly shifting panels of three to which cases 
are routed on a random basis. The active judges in each circuit are frequently joined by senior 
judges, visiting judges from other circuits, and district judges sitting by designation . . . .”).  
 170.  See Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 721, 
726 (2003) (discussing the likelihood that federal trial judges have greater familiarity with local 
norms and practice).  
 171.  See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 161, at 944–45 (disputing premise of state and regional 
heterogeneity and asserting that “the United States has one political community, and that 
political community is the United States”).  
 172.  See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 144.  
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advancement),174 and party affiliation. Focusing on the latter, Donald 
Songer and his coauthors found that “[a]lthough the courts of appeals 
may have originally been conceived as regional appellate courts, they 
have evolved into a modern-day institution staffed by men and women 
whose decisions are frequently shaped by policy views that mirror the 
beliefs of the president responsible for their appointment.”175 If 
anything accounts for circuit judicial orientation, it is the 
concentration of liberals and conservatives in a circuit (based on the 
number of appointments available to a President),176 and related 
“panel effects” (outcomes affected by the preponderance of like-minded 
judges on given three-judge panels),177 not the effects of region.178 
Finally, the model fails because circuits are not like states, 
whose sovereign “dignity” is thought worthy of respect.179 Circuit court 
decisions are rendered by life-tenured Article III judges, not 
subfederal democratic polities deserving of deference.180 Indeed, 
 
 173.  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003).  
 174.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 29–31 (2008).  
 175.  DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
OF APPEALS 143 (2000); see also id. at 142 (finding “greater variation among circuits within 
regions than between circuits from different regions” and stating that “in issue areas where we 
found virtually no variation among regions in a particular time period, we found substantial 
variation among circuits during the same time period”).  
 176.  See Yung, supra note 135, at 1162–63.  
 177.  On “panel effects” more generally, see Kim, supra note 140. 
 178.  Yung, supra note 135, at 1183–85.  
 179.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999); see also Frank Cross, The Folly of 
Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2002) (noting common emphasis on state sovereignty 
in federalism discourse).  
 180.  See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) (observing that federalism is “meant to preserve 
the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices”). By the same 
token, the varied Fourth Amendment doctrinal tapestry resulting from circuit splits lacks the 
justification operative in the First Amendment-obscenity context, a notable exception to the 
general aversion for localization of constitutional rights. See Mark D. Rosen, The Radical 
Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 927, 995 (2002) (discussing community standards doctrine). Under Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973), obscenity determinations are fact-based, case-by-case determinations often made 
by juries and based on local standards. See id. at 30. The Fourth Amendment doctrinal decisions 
at issue here, by contrast, are made by Article III judges alone and serve as governing rules for 
entire circuits. The contexts also vary in the terms of their applicable scope. With obscenity, 
those facing the risk of rights limitation (self-censorship), typically commercial creators and 
distributors of potentially obscene materials (possession in the home of obscene materials is 
protected by Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)), can mitigate their risk by keeping 
materials away from a less tolerant jurisdiction. With Fourth Amendment rights, the populace at 
large—itself not likely attuned to the rule particularities at play—faces a variable-rights regime, 
with unequal deprivations of physical liberty and privacy in the balance. Finally, even with 
obscenity, a shift is now seemingly taking place in favor of a national standard, owing to the 
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perversely, state interests can actually be undermined by circuit court 
decisions. Such is the case, for instance, when a criminal prosecution, 
susceptible of being initiated in state or federal court, “goes federal.” 
In such a situation, if a circuit embraces a more restrictive position on 
a Fourth Amendment issue, that position prevails, regardless of 
whether a state court, interpreting its own constitution, would extend 
a more expansive right.181 
2. Percolation 
A related yet distinct argument advanced in the debate over 
splits is that varied circuit positions on contested matters should be 
left to develop and percolate for a period of time. On this view, delay 
not only comports with institutional interests associated with 
Bickelsian “passive virtues,”182 but can also result in superior 
Supreme Court outcomes,183 including on constitutional questions. 
Indeed, according to Professor Dan Meador, percolation is especially 
welcome with federal constitutional law: 
[Percolation] has its greatest force in relation to constitutional questions. The Supreme 
Court’s decision on the meaning of a constitutional provision is difficult, if not virtually 
impossible as a practical matter, to change; it can only be changed through the 
cumbersome [amendment process]. Thus it is important that the Supreme Court have 
 
Internet. See Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The 
Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards in 
Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 73–79 (2010).  
 181.  See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Moreover, as earlier noted, a circuit position can 
influence state court interpretations of federal constitutional law in state court litigation. See 
supra note 162.  
 182.  See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (asserting that a key feature of the Court’s perceived 
legitimacy is its prudential restraint in deciding when to address an issue).  
 183.  See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE 48 
(1986) (“The Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, thus has the benefit of the 
experience of those lower courts, often yielding concrete information about how a particular rule 
will ‘write,’ its capacity for dealing with varying fact patterns, and the merits of alternate 
approaches.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 
YALE L.J. 883, 898 (1974) (“[Splits] can be endured and sometimes ought to be endured while 
judges and scholars observe the respective workings out in practice of the conflicting rules, 
particularly where the question of law is a close one, to which confident answer will in any case 
be impossible.”); Richard Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1155 (1990) (“Intercircuit dialogue not only benefits the quality of 
adjudication by the courts of appeals, but also aids the Supreme Court’s adjudication of cases 
involving conflicts among the circuits.”); Wallace, supra note 148, at 927 n.66 (“[I]ntercircuit 
conflicts add to the quality of federal justice by providing differing perspectives on the law to the 
Supreme Court, which therefore can make clearer and better reasoned judgments.”).  
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the benefit of as much thinking on the question as is feasible before it makes this final 
resolution.184 
The arguments in favor of percolation, however, fail to 
persuade for several reasons. First, despite occasional Court mention 
of its benefits,185 scant evidence of percolation actually exists. To test 
the percolation thesis, all Fourth Amendment-related cases decided by 
the Court from its 1981 through 2010 Terms were examined.186 The 
effort yielded several interesting results. 
Perhaps most notably, federal circuit splits explicitly figured in 
only a few opinions during the thirty-year study period. While 
analysis of the Court’s certiorari process is notoriously difficult given 
the lack of any requirement that the Court specify why a petition is 
granted or denied,187 evidence of circuit influence conceivably lies in 
the actual content of the Court’s opinions. Of the 138 Fourth 
Amendment merits opinions from the period, in only seventeen (in a 
majority, dissent, or concurrence) was there express acknowledgment 
of the existence of a federal circuit split. This paucity, while of course 
not definitive evidence of the low materiality of splits,188 at least calls 
into question their salient value and importance. 
More damning of percolation, however, is the lack of evident 
utility of splits when they are actually mentioned. Typically, when the 
 
 184.  Meador, supra note 169, at 633. Justice Ginsburg and Peter Huber offered this 
analysis: 
Under the grandly general mandates of the Bill of Rights . . . judges quite properly 
build the law through a process of accretion, erosion, and correction. This dynamic, 
too, operates in both space and time. The common law is forged in fifty states and in 
thirteen federal circuits. Variability in such areas of the law, both geographic and 
temporal, is not only permissible; it is what gives the law contemporary coherence and 
vitality. Variability in the interpretation of minutely particular federal statutes is 
another matter. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 
1425 (1987). 
 185.  See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977) 
(positing “the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the 
courts of appeals”).  
 186.  The cases were collected and reviewed on the basis of a search of the HeinOnline 
database, containing digitized versions of U.S. Reports decisions.  
 187.  Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: 
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 402 
(2004). 
 188.  See Hellman, supra note 63, at 149 (“Whether the Court refers to a conflict—or gives 
any reason for hearing the case—may depend on how the opinion is written and which Justice 
writes it.”); Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split 
Resolutions, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1162 n.90 (2011) (“[T]he Justices may have incentives to 
present a split in a certain light, or inclinations toward not including the full split (or not 
including the split at all).”). 
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Court does acknowledge a split, it merely notes its existence, usually 
but not always adverting to its role as a certiorari catalyst.189 In other 
instances, the Court merely describes how the circuits line up on an 
issue, and mentions the need to clarify the constitutionality of the 
matter in question.190 
In lieu of analyzing the merits of respective circuit positions, 
the Court usually bases its jurisprudential outcomes on prior decisions 
or opinions of individual Justices. United States v. Hensley, which 
resolved a circuit split on whether police can stop an individual based 
on reasonable suspicion of committing a past (as opposed to 
transpiring) felony,191 represents perhaps the best example of circuit 
percolation.192 Yet even there the Court merely articulated the 
position of the Ninth Circuit, with which it ultimately agreed, without 
significant analysis.193 More representative is the duo of landmark 
cases of the early 1980s concerning the “good faith” exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Despite extensive briefing by the parties on the 
divergence of opinion on the doctrinally rich question,194 the Court’s 
chief decision in United States v. Leon failed to even acknowledge the 
 
 189.  See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 695 n.4 (1996) (noting circuit split 
and stating that certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 
77, 81, 81 n.3 (1993) (same); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522, 522 n.5 (1984) (noting split in 
a footnote without mention that the split motivated grant of certiorari).  
 190.  See, e.g., Immigration & Nationalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) 
(stating that certiorari was granted because of split and because issue “has serious implications 
for the enforcement of immigration laws”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112–13 
(1984) (stating that certiorari was granted because of split and “because [drug] field tests play an 
important role in the enforcement of the narcotics laws”).  
 191.  469 U.S. 221, 225–26 (1985). Hensley, it warrants mention, did not address the 
question of whether a stop can be based on an officer’s belief that the detainee committed a past 
misdemeanor, an issue on which a split now exists. See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 
1076 n.4, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting position in conflict with Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763 
(6th Cir. 2007), on whether a stop can be based on suspicion of a completed misdemeanor).  
 192.  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011), not part of this study because it reviewed an 
opinion by the Kentucky Supreme Court, provides perhaps the optimal example of the idealized 
percolation process more generally. In King, the Court methodically identified and evaluated 
various approaches taken by state and federal courts on when police, faced with possible 
destruction of evidence, impermissibly “create” such an exigency, invalidating entry of a home 
without a search warrant. See id. at 1858–60.  
 193.  See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231–32 (citing United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 
(9th Cir. 1976)). The Court disavowed the contrary position of the Sixth Circuit, see Hensley v. 
United States, 713 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1983), with no explicit mention of the existence of a 
circuit split.  
 194.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Shepherd, 468 U.S. 981 
(1984) (No. 82-963), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 97.  
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split, instead relying on its own teachings and the views of 
commentators.195 
Again, the absence of overt critical examination of competing 
circuit positions does not conclusively prove that circuit splits lack 
influence on the Court’s substantive decisionmaking. It could certainly 
be the case that a once-contested issue, having been fully “percolated,” 
presents an easier case for the Court to resolve. Nevertheless, the 
failure to identify splits and articulate their intellectual 
underpinnings at a minimum undermines the posited informed 
deliberateness associated with percolation and justifies long-held 
skepticism regarding the theory among scholars196 and judges.197 
Yet, even if the empirical record were more persuasive, strong 
reason exists to reject the percolation rationale. Constitutional rights, 
as noted earlier, are not the proper subject of experimentation.198 
 
 195.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–26 (1983). Yet another example arose in the 
October 2011 Term when the Court, while presumably granting certiorari to address a split 
acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit and the parties, issued a brief per curiam opinion granting 
certiorari and containing no reference whatsoever to the split. See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 
990–92 (2012) (implicitly declining to distinguish exigency and emergency exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, and failing to directly address whether the exigency exception also 
requires probable cause of wrongdoing inside residence), rev’g Huff v. City of Burbank, 632 F.3d 
539, 548 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the position of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits merging the 
two exceptions, not requiring “both probable cause and exigent circumstances, including safety, 
for a warrantless entry into the home”).  
 196.  See, e.g., Caminiker, supra note 127, at 57 (“I doubt that the strength of an inferior 
court’s conviction that a particular interpretation provides the best reading will—or should—
influence the Supreme Court’s independent judgment. It is difficult to see what expertise the 
inferior court might bring to the problem that would outweigh the general presumption of 
greater proficiency in the Supreme Court.”); cf. Todd J. Tiberi, Supreme Court Denials of 
Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 879–81, 
889 (1993) (finding that, of thirty-six “percolated” decisions concerning splits on statutory 
meaning, the Court cited lower courts for propositions important to its holding in only thirteen 
cases, and that delay in resolving conflicts did not improve the quality of decisions rendered, 
based on several measures). But see Pamela C. Corley et al., Lower Court Influence on U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31, 37 (2011) (using plagiarism software to discern 
common overlap between language in court of appeals opinions and Supreme Court majority 
opinions, but failing to differentiate instances of factual recitations or “arguments relating to the 
substance of the legal questions facing the courts”).  
 197.  Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly, for example, offered the following view: 
If a case involves questions of federal law of such importance to be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, the views of the courts of appeals count, and should count, for little. I 
am unable to share the view, expressed on occasion by some polite Justices and 
entertained by some of my colleagues, that we have much to contribute in such cases; 
I doubt whether many of the Justices even read our opinions, at least on 
constitutional issues, except as these are filtered through the briefs of counsel or the 
memoranda of law clerks. 
Henry J. Friendly, Second Circuit Note, 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 407 (1972).  
 198.  See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas E. 
McFarland, The Need for a New National Supreme Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1408 (1987) 
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Disputes over the nature and reach of rights present basic normative 
questions for judicial resolution, and delay simply allows for their 
continued unequal distribution.199 As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
recognized twenty-five years ago: 
[T]o . . . suggest that it is actually desirable to allow important questions of federal law 
to ‘percolate’’ in the lower courts for a few years before the Supreme Court takes them 
on seems to me a very strange suggestion. . . . We are not engaged in a scientific 
experiment or in an effort to square the circle . . . [T]here is no obviously ‘correct ’ 
solution. . . . What we need is not the ‘correct’ answer in the philosophical or 
mathematical sense, but the ‘definitive’ answer, and the definitive answer can be given 
under our system only by the court of last resort. It is of little solace to the litigant who 
lost years ago in a court of appeals decision to learn that his case was part of the 
‘percolation’ process which ultimately allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his 
position.200 
Finally, to the extent benefit accrues, it reaches a point of 
diminishing returns once the diverse position(s) materialize.201 Splits 
do not necessarily disappear as a result of the “patient resolution of 
the conflict” within circuits, as Judge Wallace asserted.202 Rather, “law 
of the circuit” doctrine ensures the continued vitality of splits, which 
persist when the Supreme Court fails to intercede. Nor is delay 
justified because it affords another government branch an opportunity 
to act, as is the case with splits over the meaning or reach of a federal 
statute. Again, the constitutional conflicts at issue here can be 
definitively resolved only by the nation’s “one supreme Court,”203 
which “is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”204 
 
(“We cannot accept the underlying logic behind percolation—the notion that somehow a better 
reasoned Supreme Court decision will result from subjecting citizens in different parts of the 
country to differing interpretations of the same national law, either constitutional or statutory.”); 
Caminiker, supra note 127, at 59 (stating that circuit splits are not “real-world experiments that 
can help the Supreme Court Justices determine the workability and desirability of various legal 
rules governing a particular issue”). 
 199.  See Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 454 (1983) 
(“[N]owhere does the Constitution give the Supreme Court the authority to experiment with the 
legal rights of citizens. The common denominator of these rationalizations is a kind of 
institutional myopia that focuses on abstractions and ignores the impact of the law on real 
people.”).  
 200.  William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1, 11 (1986).  
 201.  See Thompson, supra note 48, at 469 (“After a few circuits have had some time to 
explore an issue, the costs of conflict will soon outweigh the marginal value of further 
experimentation.”); see also Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Circuit—A Requiem, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 690, 690, 690 n.2 (asserting that percolation theory merely accords a “false 
legitimacy” for the Supreme Court’s “deferring decisions on difficult issues”).  
 202.  Wallace, supra note 148, at 931. 
 203.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 204.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 922–23 (1995)); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: 
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Thus, contrary to the contention of Professor Meador,205 it is precisely 
in the realm of federal constitutional law, not statutory law, that 
percolation (and delay) is most problematic. 
B. Concerns 
In addition to lacking discernible instrumental benefit, the 
splits highlighted here have an array of broader negative effects, of 
both a theoretical and practical nature. 
1. National Constitutional Culture 
Americans, as manifest in the “We the People” prefacing their 
Constitution,206 have long been tied by a sense of shared constitutional 
norms.207 The question thus naturally arises whether varied circuit 
positions on Fourth Amendment rights are problematic because they 
undermine an important sense of shared constitutionalism. 
Before answering, it should not go unacknowledged that 
history provides no ironclad evidence of preordained constitutional 
consistency. The Framers failed to insert in Article III any 
requirement of uniformity208 and a similar omission marked 
subsequent congressional creation of the lower federal courts.209 
However, such observations qualify only as starting points. They not 
only neglect powerful Founding Era counterevidence favoring 
decisional uniformity—including the Supremacy Clause,210 
designation of “one supreme Court” dedicated to ultimate resolution of 
federal law,211 and the circuit riding of the Court’s Justices.212 They 
 
Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 482 (1973) (identifying Court’s role in part as being “to 
define the rights guaranteed by the Constitution”); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to 
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 895, 911 (1984) (recognizing the need for an “ultimately authoritative court at the apex of 
the judicial hierarchy”).  
 205.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
 206.  U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
 207.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 208.  See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985); Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory 
Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 356 (2006).  
 209.  Amar, supra note 208, at 208. 
 210.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the “Judges in every State shall be bound” by 
the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States”).  
 211.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 212.  See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between 
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2004). 
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also ignore the nation’s critically important post-Framing Era 
experience.  
Notably, federal criminal appeals were not even allowed until 
1879,213 and constitutional law came to figure significantly in national 
life only after the Civil War.214 The Fourth Amendment itself was 
scarcely mentioned by the Court until 1886,215 and significant 
litigation over its interpretation did not come until several decades 
later.216 One can also point to an array of other developments 
occurring over time that evidence the broader institutional desire for 
uniformity. Included in this list would be adoption of Supreme Court 
Rule 10 (specifying circuit conflict as a reason to grant certiorari)217 
and the creation of specialized subject-matter courts such as the 
Federal Circuit.218 
Nor does it suffice to assert that disuniformity is somehow 
justified by federalist tradition. It is one thing to allow courts of 
sovereign states to interpret their own constitutions, and even to 
interpret rights contained in the Federal Constitution, subject to U.S. 
Supreme Court review.219 It is yet another to permit the courts of a 
single sovereign—the U.S. Government—to variously interpret and 
apply that sovereign’s law,220 creating what has rightfully been called 
a federal “judicial Tower of Babel.”221 Doing so allows the rule of law—
and not that concerning just any subtype, but rather that concerning 
 
 213.  SURRENCY, supra note 30, at 312. Until then, only in instances of certification—when a 
circuit court was divided on a legal question and sought Supreme Court guidance—and habeas 
corpus proceedings did the Court review criminal cases. Id. at 310–11. 
 214.  See Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws 
and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 170 (2009) 
(discussing nationalizing effect of Fourteenth Amendment in particular).  
 215.  See CLANCY, supra note 16, § 2.4, at 42 (noting same and citing Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616 (1886)).  
 216.  See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982) 
(discussing history of selective incorporation); see also David M. O’Brien, Managing the Business 
of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 667, 669 (1985) (noting a marked increase in the 
filing of federal constitutional criminal procedure claims in the post–World War II period). 
 217.  See supra note 20. 
 218.  See Dragich, supra note 13, at 545–46 (noting the same and identifying other factors 
suggesting a structural desire for decisional uniformity).  
 219.  See generally MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: 
THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 87–104 (1999). 
 220.  Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) 
(“[A] single sovereign’s laws should be applied equally to all . . . .”).  
 221.  Meador, supra note 169, at 640 (condemning a “judicial Tower of Babel produced by an 
appellate system with overreliance on regionally organized courts with ever growing numbers of 
judges deciding an ever swelling number of cases, through constantly shifting three-judge panels 
with randomly assigned dockets, subject only to the remote possibility of Supreme Court 
review”).  
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constitutional rights ostensibly applicable nationwide—to vary in 
accord with the inclinations of intermediate-level judicial tribunals.222 
 Allowing such variation is a recipe for public disillusionment 
over the authoritativeness of national institutions. The federal bench 
enjoys a “franchise” on federal questions223 based on its posited 
expertise and experience,224 which federal horizontal inconsistency 
undermines.225 As Dean Caminiker recognized: 
[U]niform interpretation of federal law helps to secure popular respect for judicial 
authority. Federal courts depend on the perceived legitimacy of their enterprise for their 
authority over other government actors and the general public. This perception rests, in 
turn, on widespread acceptance and appreciation of the courts’ work product; perceived 
legitimacy endures so long as the judiciary is seen as laboring to ground its decisions in 
legal principle. Uniform interpretation of federal law throughout the land helps preserve 
this perception.226 
Ultimately, such a legitimacy deficit risks corrosion of respect 
for the Supreme Court itself. The Court’s failure to settle conflicts—by 
its own admission often due to its failure to offer guidance227—when it 
 
 222. See id. (“One of the most basic features of law is that it embodies a set of rules and 
principles applicable to everyone in like manner throughout the jurisdiction it purports to 
govern. A judicial system that produces legal doctrine differing because of the happenstance of 
the place of litigation and of the particular judges sitting on the case is hostile to the reign of 
law.”); see also Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1249 (1999) (“A central feature of the rule of law is its horizontal consistency 
of application.”); id. at 1253 (“In addition to undermining the substance of the rule of law, circuit 
splits also undermine respect for the rule of law.”).  
 223.  See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 97 (2009) (“[F]ederal courts are thought 
better able than state courts to supply uniform application of federal law . . . .”); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 85 
(suggesting that the “availability of a federal forum significantly advances th[e] goal” of uniform 
interpretation of federal law).  
 224.  Seinfeld, supra note 223, at 109.  
 225.  See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) 
(stating that federal question jurisdiction promotes uniform interpretation of federal law); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1, at 272 (5th ed. 2007) (“Another frequently offered 
justification for federal question jurisdiction is the need to ensure uniformity in the 
interpretation of federal law.”).  
 226.  Caminiker, supra note 127, at 40; see also id.: 
If federal law means X in the First Circuit and Y in the Second Circuit, then the 
public might presume that one or both circuit courts are (1) unprincipled in their 
interpretive process, (2) in error due to their incompetence, or (3) in error due to the 
indeterminate nature of legal reasoning. Each of these alternatives subverts the 
courts’ efforts to be seen as oracles of exogenous, objective, and determinant legal 
principles.  
 227.  See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006) (recognizing that lower court conflicts 
“reflect[] [a] lack of guidance from th[e] Court”); see also Penny J. White, Relinquished 
Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120, 134 (2009) (noting that “it is almost commonplace for the 
Court to issue holdings that raise as many questions as are answered”).  
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has docket capacity to do so228 undercuts public faith in the Court’s 
institutional legitimacy as the nation’s ultimate arbiter of 
constitutional law.229 
Importantly, moreover, the Court’s failure to mediate circuit 
conflicts produces a different kind of deficit—one concerning 
constitutional norms. When the Court fails to resolve uncertainties 
such as those discussed here, it fails at something more than its 
“constitutional housekeeping” mission (as when one provision properly 
might be formalistically favored over another in rationalizing an 
outcome).230 Rather, it abdicates its core responsibility to clarify the 
meaning of a right,231 implicitly signaling to the public at large that it 
is not sufficiently important to warrant the Court’s attention.232 
While problematic in general, the failure raises particular 
concern given the judiciary’s increasing latitude to avoid articulation 
of constitutional norms. This is especially apparent in civil rights 
litigation regarding qualified immunity, where Fourth Amendment 
claims are commonly raised. After Pearson v. Callahan,233 courts can 
avoid deciding whether a particular Fourth Amendment right was 
violated by police and can resolve a claim solely on the basis of 
whether the right was “clearly established.”234 Fourth Amendment 
 
 228.  See Ryan J. Owens & Donald A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking 
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1260 (2012) (suggesting that the Court’s shrinking docket 
might engender public belief that the Court “does not work sufficiently hard or is not sufficiently 
fair, and, thereby, diminish the Court’s legitimacy”).  
 229.  Suffice it to say, while to some degree unavoidable given the hierarchal nature of the 
federal system, the situation presents a zero-sum risk scenario. As Professor Robert Mikos 
helpfully pointed out to me in conversation, the Court’s repudiation of a circuit’s position on a 
question could diminish popular respect for that court.  
 230.  See Barry Friedman & Daniel Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional 
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1937 (2011) (discussing 
ongoing disagreement over textual source of dormant commerce clause doctrine despite its 
undisputed historic functional role).  
 231.  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 578 (1973) (describing the core roles of 
Supreme Court as being “to define and vindicate rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure 
the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of powers in our 
federal union”).  
 232.  See Brennan, supra note 204, at 483 (“The choice of issues for decision largely 
determines the image that the American people have of their Supreme Court.”); Cordray & 
Cordray, supra note 187, at 452 (noting that the Court’s docket selection “decisions about what to 
decide, and what not to decide, can raise or depress the salience of issues throughout American 
politics and society”).  
 233.  555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 234.  See generally Jack M. Beerman, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139. Indeed, such was the case in Pearson itself, regarding the “consent once 
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norms, moreover, often go underdeveloped as a result of other factors. 
For instance, courts regularly avoid specifying police search and 
seizure wrongs by invoking exceptions to the exclusionary rule 
(particularly inevitable discovery and officer “good faith”),235 and 
federal courts have long lacked the opportunity to unify federal 
doctrine due to an absence of habeas authority over state prisoner 
Fourth Amendment claims.236 
2. Practical Ramifications 
In addition to the foregoing normative concerns, the circuit 
splits uncovered here have a variety of subtle yet noteworthy practical 
ramifications. 
  a. “Intercircuit” Cases  
As an initial matter, varied circuit positions can have impact 
well beyond circuits’ geographic borders. One context in which this 
occurs is when a motion to suppress is filed in one circuit, based on 
charges pending there, which challenges the use of evidence or 
information secured by state, local, or federal law enforcement in 
another circuit. As one federal trial court framed the issue: 
Like intrastate divisions, the division of the nation into circuits is an intrafederal 
jurisdictional scheme. To the extent that each circuit has its own body of binding 
precedent (uniformly regarded as binding only within defined jurisdictional limits) then, 
in the absence of authoritative Supreme Court disposition of the particular issue in 
question, differences among the circuits give rise to intrafederal disputes and thus 
genuine conflicts within the meaning of conflict of laws analysis, and require a choice to 
be made where the interests of the nonforum jurisdiction are significant.237 
In such instances, federal courts typically address Fourth 
Amendment claims on the basis of a choice of law construct, adopting 
 
removed” doctrine, resulting in the continued tolerance of a split identified here. See infra 
Appendix A.  
 235.  Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 
733–42 (2011).  
 236.  See id. at 711–17 (discussing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and limits in federal 
habeas provisions that limit state prisoners’ ability to seek federal habeas relief based on alleged 
Fourth Amendment violations).  
 237.  United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 927 (D. Conn. 1987). It warrants mention 
that the question of which legal framework to apply remains a vexing one for state courts as 
well. See State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006 (Haw. 2011) (surveying various choice of law approaches 
adopted by state courts). In general, the area remains vastly underexamined and 
undertheorized, which is both odd and troublesome given the increasing state-state and state-
federal cooperative efforts of law enforcement. See Logan, supra note 107, at 1247–48 (noting 
widespread cooperative efforts undertaken by modern law enforcement).  
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a lex loci (“law of the place”) approach,238 which applies the law of the 
circuit in which the allegedly unlawful search or seizure occurred. 
According to this view, because officers cannot be expected to know 
the law of another circuit, where a case might ultimately be filed,239 
the exclusionary rule should not be applied because its deterrent 
purpose would not be served.240 
 Whatever its wisdom,241 the approach functions to ensure the 
extrajurisdictional influence of circuit doctrinal preferences. Federal 
courts must ascertain and apply the law of the search or seizure situs, 
not the forum in which they sit, in a fashion akin to that required by 
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins242 with state substantive law 
determinations. When this occurs, until such time as the Supreme 
Court conclusively states otherwise, a circuit position, even if 
embodying a distinct minority (indeed, solitary) view, can influence 
federal prosecutions beyond its bounds. Whether the external effect of 
these spillovers is seen as positive or negative of course depends on 
one’s doctrinal perspective. Regardless, while as a general rule the 
 
 238.  See, e.g., United States v. Gates, Crim. No. 08-42-P-H, 2008 WL 5382285 (D. Me. Dec. 
19, 2008) (applying Fourth Circuit law on illegal seizures); United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp. 
2d 225 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying Sixth Circuit law of consent in motion to suppress wiretap); 
United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Sixth Circuit law on 
illegal seizures); cf. United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Mass. 1991) (opining that 
federal prosecution in Connecticut would apply First Circuit law on wiretap permissibility).  
 239.  See Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. at 191 (“The Memphis officers should have been able to rely 
on their understanding of the law in the Sixth Circuit and could not have been expected to know 
the law in circuits other than the one in which they were operating.”).  
 240.  The Restrepo court continued: 
[S]uppression of evidence inadmissible in [the Second Circuit] but admissible in the 
Sixth Circuit would not deter misconduct of officers based [in the Sixth Circuit]; 
rather, it would penalize officers’ good faith efforts to comply with the law. 
Correlatively, suppressing evidence in [the Second Circuit] based on illegality in the 
Sixth Circuit, irrespective of its admissibility in [the Second Circuit], makes sense 
since it ensures that the proper level of deterrence is maintained in the locale where 
the violation occurred.  
Id. Extracircuit effect also appears possible when courts assess whether other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts, occurring elsewhere, are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United 
States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting “choice of law conundrum” 
presented by consideration of prior Maryland arrest for drugs, based on varied Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuit doctrine, but deciding that arrest would have been permissible under Eleventh 
Circuit’s more demanding standard), aff’d, 48 F. App’x 739 (11th Cir. 2002).  
 241.  One could argue, for instance, that admitting evidence not otherwise admissible in the 
forum circuit undermines judicial integrity—that the forum is diminished by allowing 
consideration of evidence illegally secured under the forum’s precedent. The judicial integrity 
rationale of the exclusionary rule, however, has been superseded by exclusive concern over 
whether exclusion holds deterrence promise. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 n.2 
(2009) (dismissing dissenting Justice Ginsburg’s “majestic conception” of the exclusionary rule as 
it relates to judicial integrity, stating that “[m]ajestic or not, our cases reject this conception”).  
 242.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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effects of constitutional rights are not externalized,243 this is one 
context in which they are. 
b. “Clearly Established” Rights and Civil Rights Litigation 
Federal circuit disuniformity can also affect civil rights 
litigation.244 To avoid a successful qualified immunity defense by an 
individual government actor, and to secure monetary relief, a plaintiff 
must prove that (1) the actor violated a constitutional right that is (2) 
“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.245 Today, 
as mentioned earlier, after Pearson v. Callahan246 reviewing courts 
can dispose of cases solely on the basis of the second prong of the test, 
avoiding a right-merits determination.247 
Application of the “clearly established” standard is 
unremarkable when the constitutionality of the government behavior 
in question has been resolved by the Supreme Court or the forum 
circuit.248 However, circuit splits complicate matters in two contexts. 
The first is when the constitutionality of the alleged 
misconduct has not been definitively addressed by the Court or the 
forum circuit. In such an instance, splits can serve as a basis to extend 
qualified immunity because no “robust ‘consensus of persuasive 
 
 243.  See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1485–86 
(2005) (citing Judge Richard Posner in support of that argument).  
 244.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing suit against state and local government actors); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (suit against federal 
government actors). Indeed, although beyond the ambit of the instant study, it warrants mention 
that the circuits are divided on basic questions concerning the litigation of civil rights suits. See, 
e.g., Amelia A. Friedman, Note, Qualified Immunity in the Fifth Circuit: Identifying the 
“Obvious” Hole in Clearly Established Law, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1290–91 (2012) (noting, inter 
alia, a circuit split on whether courts can consider policies and regulations as sources of clearly 
established law); Adrienne Lewis, Note, The Fourth Amendment—The Burden of Proof for 
Exigent Circumstances in a Warrantless Search Civil Action, 65 SMU L. REV. 221 (2012) 
(discussing circuit split on whether defendant or government has burden of proof regarding 
existence of exigent circumstances in instances of warrantless home entry by police).  
 245.  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The expectation is that “every 
‘reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates [the law].’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity shields 
government actors “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known”). 
 246.  555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  
 247.  Id. at 242 (making it a matter of discretion what “order of decision making will best 
facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case”).  
 248.  See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 3.7 (2011) 
(noting same).  
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authority’ ” exists.249 As the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently 
stated, “Where no controlling authority specifically prohibits a 
defendant’s conduct and when the federal circuit courts are split on 
the issue, the law cannot be said to be clearly established.”250 Under 
such a circumstance, circuit court disuniformity on a Fourth 
Amendment issue can serve as a shield for government actors, based 
on a successful qualified immunity defense.251 At the same time, it 
possibly allows for continued existence of a split (as occurred in 
Pearson itself)252 and underenforcement of an ostensibly national 
right.253 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd254 
suggests another way in which disuniformity can function to shield 
governmental actors—“national officeholders” in particular. In al-
Kidd, an individual filed a federal civil rights action against former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft,255 alleging that Ashcroft detained 
him as a material witness as a preventive detention measure, without 
any actual intent to use him as a witness and without sufficient 
evidence to charge him with any crime.256 The Ninth Circuit agreed,257 
but the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
concluded that al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
because he was held on a valid warrant issued by a magistrate and 
that the government’s motive in detaining him, even if pretextual, was 
irrelevant.258 More important to the present discussion was the 
 
 249.  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).  
 250.  Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
 251.  Of course, a uniform stance among other circuits on the constitutionality of challenged 
government conduct can likewise serve as a shield when neither the Court nor the forum circuit 
has addressed the issue. See, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (attaching importance to uniform 
circuit approval of “consent-once-removed” doctrine regarding undercover officers).  
 252.  See id. at 244–45 (failing to address the merits of the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that 
the “consent-once-removed” doctrine covers confidential informants, splitting from view of the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits).  
 253.  See John C. Jeffries, Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. 
CT. REV. 115, 131 (observing that costs of avoidance “are not measured solely, even chiefly, in the 
persistence of uncertainty in the law. The greater problem is the underenforcement of 
constitutional rights while such uncertainty continues.”).  
 254.  131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).  
 255.  The statute allows a federal judge to “order the arrest of [a] person” whose testimony is 
“material in a criminal proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure 
the presence of the person by subpoena.” 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). The witness must be released 
if his or her testimony “can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not 
necessary to prevent a failure of justice.” Id.  
 256.  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.  
 257.  See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 258.  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
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Court’s analysis of the qualified immunity question. In a pointed 
rebuke to the Ninth Circuit, Justice Scalia condemned the latter 
court’s conclusion that a federal trial court decision (from another 
circuit) condemning Ashcroft’s behavior qualified as clearly 
established law.259 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor, concurred and elaborated on the clearly established 
question, emphasizing that a defendant’s status as a national officer 
“must inform what law is clearly established.”260 Unlike government 
defendants acting within a single jurisdiction, an official such as the 
Attorney General “sets policies implemented in many jurisdictions 
throughout the country” and hence may be subject to varied circuit 
positions on particular legal matters.261 Such conflicts, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, oblige greater solicitude on the issue of qualified 
immunity: 
A national officeholder intent on retaining qualified immunity need not abide by the 
most stringent standard adopted anywhere in the United States. And the national 
officeholder need not guess at when a relatively small set of appellate precedents have 
established a binding rule. If national officeholders were subject to personal liability 
whenever they confronted disagreement among appellate courts, those officers would be 
deterred from the full use of their legal authority. . . . Furthermore, too expansive a view 
of “clearly established law” would risk giving local judicial determinations the effect of 
rules with de facto national significance, contrary to the normal process of ordered 
appellate review.262 
At least to four members of the Court, it thus appears that 
circuit splits have additional special consequence for “national 
officeholder[s],” a matter of particular significance given the 
increasing involvement of such officeholders in law enforcement 
operations,263 including relative to national security matters.264 
 
 259.  Id. at 2083–84 (citing United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 55, 57 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002)).  
 260.  Id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 261.  See id. (“The official with responsibilities in many jurisdictions may face ambiguous 
and sometimes inconsistent sources of decisional law. While it may be clear that one Court of 
Appeals may have approved a certain course of conduct, other Courts of Appeals may have 
disapproved it, or at least reserved the issue.”).  
 262.  Id. at 2087.  
 263.  See Logan, supra note 107, at 1247–48 (noting increased state-federal cooperation in 
law enforcement activities).  
 264.  See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 1278 (noting that “[t]he consequences of [over] deterrence 
must counsel caution by the Judicial Branch, particularly in the area of national security”).  
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c. “Good Faith” Reliance on “Settled” Case Law and the Exclusionary 
Rule 
Circuit disuniformity could well also influence application of 
the exclusionary rule. Since United States v. Leon265 law enforcement 
agents have been forgiven their “good faith” mistakes over the 
constitutionality of their actions. While to date the Court has not 
expressly applied the exception beyond specified circumstances, such 
as when police act pursuant to an invalid warrant,266 statutory 
authority,267 or a defective database,268 lower courts have extended the 
exception to other contexts.269 More important, six Justices seemingly 
backed an expansive orientation in the Court’s recent opinion in Davis 
v. United States,270 which addressed whether the exclusionary rule 
should apply when police satisfy binding constitutional precedent that 
is later reversed. 
In Davis, Alabama police, relying on the expansive authority 
afforded by New York v. Belton,271 arrested Davis for driving while 
intoxicated, secured him in a patrol car, and upon searching his 
vehicle discovered an illegal handgun inside.272 While Davis was 
convicted of the federal firearms charge, he preserved his Fourth 
Amendment claim that the auto search was impermissible, based on 
the Supreme Court’s intervening grant of certiorari in Arizona v. 
Gant, which challenged the continued validity of Belton’s per se rule. 
In due course, the Gant Court significantly limited police 
authority to search vehicles incident to arrest, allowing a search only 
if an “arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the 
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”273 With his case on 
direct appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, Davis argued that neither 
requirement prescribed by Gant—announced two years after police 
searched his vehicle—was satisfied, requiring suppression of the 
 
 265.  468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (withholding application of the exclusionary rule when police 
act with objectively “reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct is lawful).  
 266.  Id. at 926. 
 267.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 268.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).  
 269.  See, e.g., United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009) 
(surveying cases extending good faith exception to situations not expressly addressed by the 
Court).  
 270.  131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 271.  453 U.S. 454, 458–59 (1981).  
 272.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.  
 273.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).  
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firearm discovered and reversal of his conviction.274 The Eleventh 
Circuit disagreed, holding that while traditional retroactivity law 
obliged that the new rule announced in Gant apply to Davis’s case, as 
it was on direct appeal,275 the exclusionary rule did not apply because 
its deterrent function would not be served when police acted in 
objectively reasonable reliance on settled precedent, “even when that 
precedent is subsequently overturned.”276 
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, joined by five other 
Justices, the Court agreed. Because the vehicle search complied with 
Belton and settled Eleventh Circuit precedent,277 the requisite officer 
“culpability” sufficient to serve the deterrence rationale of the 
exclusionary rule was lacking.278 “[W]hen binding appellate precedent 
specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers 
will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public 
safety responsibilities.”279 Leon’s good faith exception applies when 
police, as in Davis, act in “objectively reasonable reliance on binding 
appellate precedent.”280 
Davis, while surely important for its diminution of retroactivity 
doctrine and emphasis on the need for police “culpability” in good faith 
analysis, also has the potential to elevate the practical importance of 
circuit splits. This much was evident in the concurrence of Justice 
Sotomayor and the dissent of Justice Breyer (joined by Justice 
Ginsburg). Justice Sotomayor, who at oral argument voiced concern 
over the effect of circuit splits,281 agreed that deterrence would not be 
appreciably served by holding police responsible for binding appellate 
precedent that is later overruled.282 However, she was at pains to 
emphasize that the majority’s holding did not concern an instance 
 
 274.  598 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 275.  See id. at 1263 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).  
 276.  Id. at 1264.  
 277.  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and 
United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1996)).  
 278.  Id.  
 279.  Id. at 2429.  
 280.  Id. at 2434; see also id. at 2429 (“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in 
reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”). 
 281.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (No. 
09–11328), 2011 WL 972573 at *33: 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, if there’s a circuit split, how do we encourage police 
officers to be careful about the Fourth Amendment? . . . If there’s a circuit split and a 
police officer knows that other circuits are saying this is unconstitutional, why are we 
taking away the deterrent effect of having thoughts occur to the officer about thinking 
through whether there’s a better way and a legal way to do things?  
 282.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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when the constitutionality of a challenged police practice “is 
unsettled.”283 Justice Breyer’s dissent inferred just such a broader 
view of the Davis majority. If police culpability is a prerequisite, 
Justice Breyer reasoned, the good faith exception will also cover 
situations when an officer conducts a search thought constitutional 
“but which, it turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment’s 
bounds,” or when clear circuit precedent “just does not exist” on the 
constitutionality of the conduct in question.284 
Given the undisguised hostility that many of the Court’s 
members have for the exclusionary rule, it would come as no surprise 
to soon see what Justice Breyer called the majority’s “new ‘good faith’ 
exception” for police reliance on unsettled case law assume a more 
concrete form. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit in Davis itself noted a 
judicial tendency to extend good faith to a situation when “intercircuit 
caselaw” is “‘unclear’” as a result of circuit disuniformity.285 It 
certainly could be argued that an officer, working in a circuit lacking a 
definitive decision on the constitutionality of a search or seizure 
practice, and mindful of varied circuit positions on the practice,286 
lacks the kind of “deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent” conduct 
now seemingly required.287 If so, much as in the qualified immunity 
context, which shares the same standard of objective 
reasonableness,288 circuit disuniformity could serve as a defensive 
shield for government actors and the underenforcement of a 
constitutional norm. 
 
 283.  Id.; see also id. (“Whether exclusion would deter Fourth Amendment violations where 
appellate precedent does not specifically authorize a certain practice and, if so, whether the 
benefits of exclusion would outweigh its costs are questions unanswered by our previous 
decisions.”).  
 284.  Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 285.  United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264 n.3 (citing United States v. Brunette, 256 
F.3d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2001)).  
 286.  As Professor LaFave notes in his treatise, the Court’s heavy emphasis on the 
reasonable reliance of the officer in Davis amounted to either “fantasized reliance or 
conclusively-presumed reliance” given the absence of any record evidence of the officer’s actual 
awareness of Eleventh Circuit precedent allowing the challenged conduct. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.3 (4th ed. 2011).  
 287.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2408; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).  
 288.  See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004) (stating that the “same standard of 
objective reasonableness” applies in Leon suppression hearings and qualified immunity 
hearings).  
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d. Federal Forum Shopping 
One final practical ramification of circuit disuniformity relates 
to possible forum shopping. As noted earlier, enablement of “forum 
shopping among circuits” was one of the four concerns singled out by 
the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1990 when assessing if a 
circuit split was “intolerable.”289 
The federal government enjoys expansive authority to bring 
criminal charges by virtue of its flexible venue rules,290 especially 
when prosecuting child pornography and obscenity,291 mail/wire 
fraud,292 and conspiracy cases.293 More generally, multidistrict 
offenses, such as those involving cybercrime,294 may be prosecuted “in 
any district in which [an] offense was begun, continued, or 
completed.”295 
Forum shopping is a recognized feature of modern criminal 
justice. The most well-known instance occurs when concurrent state 
and federal jurisdiction exists over misconduct and cases “go federal,” 
due to what are seen as more prosecution-friendly federal law and 
punishment options.296 Yet forum shopping also occurs intrafederally. 
The phenomenon was in evidence when the U.S. government decided 
to prosecute Zacarias Moussaoui in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
not New York, because the former was viewed as more conducive to 
 
 289.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 290.  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) (“[W]here a 
crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any 
part can be proved to have been done.”); United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 314 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“Venue [for a criminal case] will lie wherever . . . essential conduct elements [of the 
charged offense] have occurred. Venue will also lie where the effects of the defendant’s conduct 
are felt . . . .”).  
 291.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-75.400 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ (stating that prosecution can occur where material is 
mailed, deposited, or received or an intermediate through which the material passes).  
 292.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 967, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00000.htm (stating that 
prosecutions “may be instituted in any district in which an interstate or foreign transmission  
was issued or terminated”).  
 293.  See United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1999) (“In a conspiracy 
prosecution, ‘venue is proper in any district in which an overt act . . . was committed by any of 
the coconspirators.’ ” (quoting United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994))).  
 294.  See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 118, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime 
/docs/ccmanual.pdf (classifying cybercrime as an offense controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) 
governing multidistrict offenses).  
 295.  18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2006).  
 296.  See Logan, supra note 107, at 1248–49.  
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prosecutorial interests.297 Federal rules also permit strategic filing in 
less high-profile cases. The United States Attorneys’ Manual, for 
instance, expressly allows for consideration of “legal or evidentiary 
problems that might attend prosecution” when venue permits filing in 
more than one district.298 While interoffice competition among U.S. 
Attorney offices perhaps makes it unlikely for a case to be channeled 
to another circuit, one with a more attractive (i.e., less demanding) 
Fourth Amendment position, the possibility nonetheless exists.299 
Moreover, as Professor Dan Richman has noted, prosecutors are not 
the sole deciders of federal criminal filings. Law enforcement officials 
“are primarily responsible for case selection and choice of investigative 
tactics,”300 and influence choice over the “best” district to which to 
channel cases.301 
Federal courts typically condone forum shopping,302 albeit not 
always happily.303 Professor Amanda Frost, in assessing federal circuit 
splits in the area of federal civil statutes and regulations, has offered 
that forum shopping can be “entirely benign”: 
As long as both parties have the latitude to argue for their favored forum . . . there is 
nothing wrong with each attempting to have the case heard where they prefer—whether 
because it is more convenient, the jury or judges seem more sympathetic, or the law in 
the circuit is more favorable.304  
With federal criminal litigation, however, forum selection discretion is 
entirely one sided—the government makes the call.305 This offers 
potential strategic advantage to a single party. Furthermore, physical 
 
 297.  See Paul Bradley, Terrorism Trial Is First Major Test, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 27, 2011, at A1.  
 298.  U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 291, § 9-27.240(B), (B)(2); see also id. § 9-75.100 
(specifying that “[i]n deciding in which district(s) to initiate charges” the “applicable law” should 
be among the factors considered).  
 299.  Indeed, Professor Hellman’s study of circuit splits highlighted the consciousness of and 
effect on the practice of the Army Corps of Engineers, a federal executive actor like the 
Department of Justice, relative to varied circuit positions on the interpretation of federal 
statutory requirements. See Hellman, supra note 50, at 747–48.  
 300.  Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 751 (2003).  
 301.  Id. at 759–60, 783–84.  
 302.  See, e.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 832 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
venue was proper in the district in which materials were received, notwithstanding forum-
shopping allegation).  
 303.  See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 162 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting 
occurrence of forum-shopping and encouraging the Fifth Circuit to assess whether it qualifies as 
the kind of “abuse and/or collusion” that warrants further scrutiny).  
 304.  Frost, supra note 13, at 1602.  
 305.  See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 116 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing 
that “[t]he criminal defendant is an involuntary litigant”).  
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liberty, not civil monetary damages or injunctive relief, hangs in the 
balance, accentuating the consequences of the government monopoly. 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
If one accepts that the disuniformity highlighted here is 
problematic, and that more clarity and consistency in national 
constitutional law is desirable, the question arises over how best to 
proceed. While splits figure centrally in the Court’s current docket,306 
which is now smaller than at any time in recent history,307 the matters 
subject to plenary review have been characterized as often being “close 
to trivial” in nature.308 Meanwhile, dozens of constitutional conflicts, 
such as those involving the Fourth Amendment matters noted here, go 
unresolved. 
Any solution, it must be noted, is complicated by the limited 
range of institutional options available. When federal courts differ on 
the meaning of a statute, potential recourse lies in legislative action: 
Congress can amend the statute309 or provide clarification based on a 
question certified by a federal court.310 Questions concerning the 
meaning and application of constitutional provisions, however, are 
within the sole purview of the judiciary,311 with the Supreme Court 
having ultimate say.312 Given this reality, focus must remain on the 
 
 306.  See Frost, supra note 13, at 1569 (noting that up to seventy percent of the Court’s 
docket concerns a judicial split of some sort); see also Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role 
of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006) (“A 
lower court split . . . is a major part of what I look for when I review the stack of [certiorari 
recommendation] memos of law clerks.”).  
 307.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 308.  Frost, supra note 13, at 1659. The menial quality of the Court’s plenary docket would 
thus appear to defy the intent of at least one sitting Justice. See Breyer, supra note 306, at 96 
(noting that the Court is “not particularly interested in ironing out minor linguistic discrepancies 
among the lower courts because those discrepancies are not outcome determinative”).  
 309.  See Stephanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal 
Circuit Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61, 66–67 (2001) (noting that between 1990 and 1998 Congress 
sought to amend existing statutes or enact new laws to resolve at least nineteen federal circuit 
splits). The practice would appear to align with a proposal advanced by then-Judge Ruth 
Ginsburg under which “Congress would take a second look at a law once a court opinion or two 
highlighted the measure’s infirmities.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 995, 996 (1987). 
 310.  See generally Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
11–13 (2007).  
 311.  See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.  
 312.  What Professor Monaghan has referred to as the “constitutional common law,” not 
“subject to amendment, modification or even reversal by Congress.” Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 31 
(1975); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Role for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. 
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Court, a daunting specter given its impressive ability to evade 
successive reform efforts that seek to modify or limit its agenda-
setting prerogative and authority.313 
Yet an option remains, one with necessary institution-forcing 
effect: certification. Although certification is now largely ignored, 
federal courts of appeals have long had the power to certify legal 
questions to the Supreme Court for authoritative determination when 
disagreement exists. The practice of certification dates back to 1802 
when Congress, concerned that the six two-member circuit courts then 
in existence would create intracircuit splits, instructed that the Court 
upon certification “shall . . . finally decide . . . any question . . . before a 
circuit court upon which the opinions of the judges shall be 
opposed.”314 Indeed, a circuit “division of opinion” was the only way 
that a criminal case could reach the Court until 1889,315 and 
 
REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that the Court has always played the “leading role in defining the 
content of federal law for the judiciary”); Henry P. Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda 
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 681 n.79 (2012) [hereinafter Monaghan, 
Avoiding Avoidance] (referring to the Supreme Court as “the priestly interpreter of our 
Constitution”).  
 313.  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. For examples of more recent proposals 
see, for example, Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: 
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009) (urging 
creation of a certiorari division of appellate judges to select cases for the Court to decide); George 
& Guthrie, supra note 11 (advocating an increase in the size of the Court’s membership, 
authorizing panel decisions of the Court, and retaining en banc procedure for select cases); David 
S. Law, How to Rig the Federal Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 779 (2011) (urging adoption of a National 
Court of Appeals, first proposed by the Freund Committee).  
  One option could involve creation of a specialized court for constitutional criminal 
appeals, akin to that created for intellectual property law matters (the Federal Circuit). 
However, such a court, in addition to its political vulnerability to attacks from those desiring to 
maintain the status quo, would be problematic. Concern over judicial bias or capture, even 
involving life-tenure judges not subject to politically mortal sound bites of “pro-defendant” 
outcomes, would be a constant. See POSNER, supra note 121, at 254–56 (asserting that outcomes 
of specialized courts can be controlled by membership appointments); Richard L. Revesz, 
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1149–53 
(1990) (discussing how special interest groups are more likely to capture specialized courts than 
courts of general jurisdiction). Perhaps more important, channeling constitutional criminal 
matters away from the Supreme Court would have negative structural effects. As Paul 
Carrington long ago observed: “Whatever may be said about specialization of courts dealing with 
esoteric, highly technical subjects, there is little to be said for narrowing specialization in a field 
so dominated by basic human values as is the criminal law.” Carrington, supra note 40, at 576–
77. 
 314.  Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159; see also United States v. Daniel, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 542, 548 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (offering that in the absence of certification a 
“division of opinion” might “remain and the question would continue unsettled”).  
 315.  See United States v. Rider, 163 U.S. 132, 138 (1896) (noting that with criminal cases “a 
certificate of division was the only mode in which alleged errors could be reviewed”).  
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certification was a mainstay in nineteenth-century criminal cases.316 
Later, certification played a central role in the Evarts Act in 1891, 
creating the modern courts of appeals, providing a means to “guard 
against diversity of judgment” by “send[ing] up” divisive legal 
questions.317 Availability of certification also paved the way in the 
Judiciary Act of 1925 for approval of increased certiorari authority of 
the Court, assuring Congress that the Justices would not unilaterally 
control their plenary docket, but would rather share control with the 
courts of appeals.318 
While in subsequent decades certification remained a prime 
vehicle to the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases alike,319 it has 
enjoyed scant use in recent years. Even though both the U.S. Code320 
and Supreme Court Rule 19321 allow certification and it technically 
remains a vestige of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction,322 
the Court has only rarely accepted certified questions since 1940, and 
not a single instance of certification has been recorded since 1981.323 
Writing in 1949, Professors Moore and Vestal offered an explanation 
for the aversion that likely still obtains: that the Court fears that 
certification will “frustrate [its] proper functioning as a policy-
 
 316.  See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 196 (1960) (“Certification of questions occurred 
frequently in criminal cases. A persistent conflict in lower court decisions could be expected to 
result, sooner or later, in a divergence of opinion among the judges of one of the circuit courts, 
permitting the question to be certified to the Supreme Court for resolution.”). 
 317.  See 21 CONG. REC. 10,222 (1890) (statement of Sen. William Evarts).  
 318.  See Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1710 (“In the hearings on the Judges’ Bill, it was 
repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction, but that the 
courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control.”).  
 319.  See id. at 1656 (discussing frequent resort to certification).  
 320.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006) (“Cases in the court of appeals may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court . . . [b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question in any civil 
or criminal case as to which instructions are desired . . . .”). 
 321.  See SUP. CT. R. 19(1) (“A United States court of appeals may certify to this Court a 
question or proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.”).  
 322.  See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4038, at 62–64 
(3d ed. 2006) (stating that “in form and history . . . certified question jurisdiction is mandatory”); 
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 (1930) (“Petitions for certiorari the Court can deny, but questions certified 
must be answered.”). Consistent with this status, when the Court refuses to hear a certified 
question the matter is “dismissed,” whereas a petition for a writ of certiorari is “denied.” See, e.g., 
United States v. Seale, 130 S. Ct. 12, 12 (2009) (“The question certified by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is dismissed.”).  
 323.  Id. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certified question).  
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determining body by greatly restricting the time available for the 
discretionary side of its docket.”324 
This Article joins a handful of other recent commentaries 
urging rejuvenation of the well-established practice of certification.325 
Plainly, something more is needed to oblige the Court to resolve the 
circuit splits discussed here, which number among what Justice Story 
called the “jarring and discordant judgments” that only the Court can 
“harmonize . . . into uniformity.”326 While scholars continue to debate 
the reasons behind the Court’s shrinking plenary docket—ranging 
from risk-averse law clerks whose recommendations dominate the 
“cert. pool” used by Justices,327 to the retirement of Justice Byron 
White, an outspoken advocate of the view that the Court should 
resolve circuit splits328—unresolved splits on constitutional questions 
endure and proliferate with each Court term. 
The certification statute, now codified at 28 United States Code 
Section 1254,329 should be retooled by Congress330 to explicitly require 
 
 324.  James W. Moore & Alan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in 
Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1949); see also EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., 
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 597 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that the Court disfavors broadened use of 
certification because it “would frustrate the Court’s discretionary power to limit its review to 
cases it deems worthy” and afford lower courts power to dictate its docket).  
 325.  See George & Guthrie, supra note 11, at 1449–51 (urging greater use of certification 
more generally in resolving circuit splits); Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s 
Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 483, 492 (2010); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting 
the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310, 
1313 (2010); Kevin G. Crennan, Note, The Viability of Certification in Federal Appellate 
Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2025 (2011).  
 326.  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816).  
 327.  See Owens & Simon, supra note 228, at 1234–37.  
 328.  Id. at 1241–42. 
 329.  The statute notes specific circumstances under which certification is appropriate:  
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following 
methods: 
By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal 
case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree; 
By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or 
criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the 
Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent 
up for decision of the entire matter in controversy. 
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006). A parallel provision is contained in the Court’s rules. See SUP. CT. R. 19 
(“A United States court of appeals may certify to [the Supreme Court] a question or proposition 
of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.”).  
 330.  Ideally, the change advocated here would emanate from the Court itself. However, the 
Court’s dismissive treatment of certification in recent decades belies faith that the Court would 
undertake on its own a change making certification explicitly nondiscretionary in nature. 
Congress would enjoy authority to make such a change under Article III, which expressly affords 
Congress power to impose “regulations” regarding the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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that the Court accept a certified question of constitutional law on 
which the circuits have split.331 How and when such certification can 
be sought and must be granted, however, presents a potentially 
confounding empirical question. Under the current discretionary 
certiorari regime, as discussed, circuits lack compelling basis to heed 
one another’s positions on issues, and the Supreme Court can and does 
avoid resolving conflicts that arise. With mandatory jurisdiction, a 
circuit court could in effect dictate Court jurisdiction by adopting a 
discordant stance (as apparently occurred in the circuit-riding era).332 
While research suggests that fear of reversal by the Supreme Court in 
itself does not drive circuit case outcomes,333 the negative reputational 
and other professional and institutional consequences of reversal 
make it doubtful that a court would manufacture a split, and adopt a 
position that it otherwise would not, merely to get an issue 
docketed.334 Indeed, experience in Florida, where intermediate 
appellate courts for more than thirty years have been afforded power 
to certify conflict matters to the state supreme court for discretionary 
review (which it typically grants), provides no reason to conclude that 
circuit courts would conduct themselves in this manner.335 However, if 
experience proves otherwise, certification could be limited to instances 
 
 331.  Consistent with custom, the questions themselves must be distinct and definite. See 
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, § 106, at 779:  
Certification is limited to questions of law, and the questions must be distinct and 
definite. The Court will dismiss a certification in which the questions are so broad 
that they in effect bring up the whole case, although when a case has been certified 
the Court itself may require that the entire record be sent up for decision of the entire 
matter in controversy.  
 332.  See id. (noting that judges on early era two-judge panels would frequently “disagree 
deliberately in order to bring a question to the Supreme Court”).  
 333.  See David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower 
Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003) (examining a sample of circuit search and 
seizure cases over a thirty-year period and emphasizing the importance of the low possibility of 
Supreme Court review).  
 334.  See id. at 581–82 (discussing factors accounting for judges’ desire to avoid reversal by 
superior courts).  
 335.  Harry L. Anstead et al., The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
Florida, 29 NOVA L. REV. 431, 529–31 (2005); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, § 106, at 
779 (stating that former practice of manufacturing jurisdiction on basis of dissent is “no longer 
considered proper. The courts of appeals recognize that certificates should be granted only when 
they actually are in doubt on a question.”).  
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when a third circuit court weighs in on a disputed matter,336 removing 
the incentive for a second circuit court to engage in gamesmanship.337 
Finally, the Court should be afforded a modest degree of 
latitude to avoid certification, such as when a case appears to be a 
poor vehicle to resolve the contested question, perhaps due to concern 
over jurisdiction or justiciability.338 Consistent with transparency 
interests, however, the Court should be obliged to specify why it did 
not take the case.339 
Such a change would have several benefits. First, it would 
allow for the accelerated, authoritative resolution of splits.340 This 
would lessen the many problems generated by disparate circuit 
positions discussed earlier,341 and allow the Court to fulfill its 
institutional promise to ensure constitutional uniformity, made 
decades ago when it convinced Congress to allow it near-total 
discretionary control (via certiorari) over its docket.342 Second, it would 
permit creation of a framework for a more dialogic relationship 
between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, enabling “lower 
court judges themselves to inform the Court—directly and formally—
that an issue is important” and warrants immediate resolution.343 The 
change would thus rehabilitate an important institutional relationship 
 
 336.  See ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 183, at 58 (deeming a circuit conflict 
“intolerable” and deserving of Supreme Court review when “at least three courts have passed on 
the question”).  
 337.  Adopting the alternate approach would, however, have the obvious downside of 
allowing the difficulties noted earlier to persist until a third court gets around to deciding the 
disputed issue.  
 338.  I am indebted to Arthur Hellman for this very helpful suggestion.  
 339.  Similar reason-giving has long been urged in the certiorari denial context where, unlike 
here, the enormous volume of petitions significantly undercuts the practicality of such a 
requirement. See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law 
Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2011). 
 340.  See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495 (1909) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “[certified] questions are to be encouraged as a mode of disposing of 
cases in the least cumbersome and most meritorious way”).  
 341.  See supra Part III.  
 342.  See Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1705 (noting Justices’ assurance to Congress, when 
contemplating passage of the “Judges’ Bill” of 1925, “that certiorari is always granted when there 
is a conflict between courts of appeals and would always be granted when there was an arguable 
constitutional claim”); see also William H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 
KY. L.J. 3, 18 (1916) (publishing May 23, 1914 remarks that “questions of constitutional 
construction” are of such critical importance that they should comprise the Court’s mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction).  
 343.  Tyler, supra note 325, at 1326.  
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within the federal judiciary,344 a relationship that the earlier 
discussion of percolation makes clear is now in a state of major 
disrepair.345 Finally, enhanced certification would infuse the Court’s 
docket-assemblage process with a welcome measure of transparency 
and consistency, lacking in the current idiosyncratic346 and inscrutable 
certiorari apparatus.347 
Notwithstanding certification’s historic pedigree,348 such a 
change would inevitably garner opposition. For instance, those 
revering Bickelsian “passive virtues” and judicial restraint349 would 
not rush to embrace increased jurisdictional reach of the Court. Nor, 
for that matter, will the results ultimately reached by the Court, 
imposed nationwide, be to everyone’s liking.350 However, disuniformity 
itself presents significant problems, lending credence to the wisdom of 
one of Professor Bickel’s near-contemporaries, Justice Brandeis, who 
observed that ultimately “it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right.”351 Concern might also 
 
 344.  See Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1710 (noting that “[i]n hearings on the Judges’ Bill [of 
1925], it was repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction, 
but that the courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control”).  
 345.  See supra notes 185–205 and accompanying text; see also Arthur D. Hellman, The 
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 436–37 (condemning the 
tendency of the Court to “recurrently ignore[] the efforts of lower-court judges to address issues 
on its docket, while remaining aloof from the day-to-day operation of the rules it lays down”); cf. 
Ashutosh Bhagwhat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and 
the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 986 (2000) (noting the isolation of the 
Supreme Court from the lower federal courts that it supervises).  
 346.  See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 175–76 (1980) 
(referring to certiorari selection process as “highly personal”); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 
SUPREME COURT, HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 265 (1987) (referring to certiorari as a “rather 
subjective decision”); Brennan, supra note 204, at 478 (referring to certiorari decisionmaking 
process as a matter of “feel”).  
 347.  See Watts, supra note 339, at 14–21 (discussing various concerns over the certiorari-
dominated process by which the Court’s plenary docket takes shape).  
 348.  See supra notes 314–18 and accompanying text. 
 349.  Bickel, supra note 182. For a critical view of the approach, calling into question its 
motivational principles, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) 
(asserting that “Bickel’s ‘virtues’ are ‘passive’ in name and appearance only; a virulent variety of 
free-wheeling interventionism lies at the core of his devices of restraint”).  
 350.  With Fourth Amendment doctrine in particular, general cause for pessimism among 
civil libertarians has been mitigated by a few recent cases limiting police search and seizure 
authority. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (limiting authority of police to search 
auto interiors incident to lawful arrest of recent occupant); Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 
(2000) (deeming police scanning of home with thermal imaging equipment a search). 
 351.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see 
also Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Caseload: A Question of Law or Politics?, 
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 100 (2010) (stating that it need not be the case that “the Court’s own 
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be raised, especially by the powerful Supreme Court Bar, that an 
infusion of certified cases will crowd out cases the Court might 
otherwise select as a result of its certiorari process.352 To the extent 
this proves well founded,353 the outcome should be received as a 
welcome opening of the constitutional playing field, one consistent 
with a less “Olympian” Supreme Court, more helpful to the daily work 
of lower federal courts charged with handling the detailed realities of 
federal constitutional litigation.354 
CONCLUSION 
Federal appellate judicial disagreement on issues of federal 
law, applicable to the nation as a whole, has long prompted concern. 
Curiously, however, to date research and debate have concentrated on 
civil, nonconstitutional law, and failed to systematically examine the 
actual consequences of splits.355 This Article reports the results of a 
first-of-its-kind study of federal constitutional law circuit splits. 
Focusing on the Fourth Amendment in particular, the study 
highlights the existence of over three dozen current conflicts, 
including many that have persisted for years.  
 
decision will exhibit any particularly great wisdom or serve the country well. Rather, it is an 
almost Hobbesian argument that there must be a sovereign to resolve controversies, and that 
such a role should be played . . . by the Supreme Court.”).  
 352.  See Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 
89–90 (2009) (noting influence of “an elite group of expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated 
by those in the private bar,” and voicing concern over its “undesirable skewing in the content of 
the Court’s docket”); id. at 91 (“[T]he Court regularly grants cases at the urging of leading 
members of the private sector Supreme Court bar that are marginally certiorari worthy at best, 
at a time when the rates of certiorari are rapidly declining.”); Watts, supra note 339, at 62–63 
(discussing powerful role of “expert Supreme Court bar” and the capture risks it creates).  
 353.  As for the accumulated backlog of splits, they could be resolved in any number of ways, 
including, at least relative to the Fourth Amendment splits highlighted here, during a single 
Term by the Court (added to the roughly eighty cases now annually heard, resulting in a Term 
docket of under 120 cases, eminently sustainable by historical standards).  
 354.  See Hellman, supra note 345, at 433 (“The Justices seldom engage in the process of 
developing the law through a succession of cases in the common-law tradition. Rather, Court 
decisions tend to be singular events, largely unconnected to other cases on the docket and even 
more detached from the work of lower [federal] courts.”); see also Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of 
Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 408 (2004) (urging that the Court take “a larger number of 
Fourth Amendment cases, in patterns that enable ongoing oversight of what is, for better or 
worse, an important body of judge-made law”).  
 355.  See Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 89 (“The argument that circuit splits should lead to 
more prolific Supreme Court review may seem appealing in the abstract, but it breaks down 
when proponents are asked to inventory the actual burdens of such splits on litigants and the 
public.”).  
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The existence of so much variation is surprising given the 
Court’s avowed aversion for constitutional disuniformity,356 penchant 
for defending its constitutional turf,357 and worry over variable 
outcomes relative to federal substantive criminal law.358 It also raises 
an array of troubling normative and practical concerns. 
While other work has suggested that circuit conflicts consume 
an undue amount of attention on the Court’s current docket, this 
Article reaches the opposite conclusion. Splits on multiple important 
Fourth Amendment issues now warrant resolution by the Court, and 
delay or failure is not justified by the instrumental arguments 
advanced by those untroubled by disuniformity, such as percolation or 
regional experimentation. Furthermore, splits will likely only continue 
to increase in number given ever-growing circuit court caseloads and 
the modest size of the Court’s certiorari-based plenary docket. 
To remedy this institutional deficiency, the Article recommends 
resuscitation of a long-dormant vestige of the Court’s mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction: certification, modified to ensure that the Court 
fulfills its role as the paramount locus vivendi of federal constitutional 
law. While the focus here has been on the Fourth Amendment, circuits 
disagree on other constitutional criminal procedure matters affecting 
physical liberty (if not privacy),359 which certification will 
ameliorate.360 Moreover, the enhanced certainty afforded will 
 
 356.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 357.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 300–19 (2002) 
(surveying decline of Court’s deference to congressional constitutional judgments); Barry 
Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial 
Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1172–82 (2011) (noting various arenas in which the 
modern Court has expanded its constitutional interpretive authority). At the same time, as 
Professor Monaghan recently observed, the Court has been steadfast in its refusal to cede any 
measure of its interpretative authority to other judicial actors. See Monaghan, Avoiding 
Avoidance, supra note 312, at 688 (noting that Court is “reluctant to leave important 
propositions of federal law for final disposition in the hands of judicial actors other than itself”).  
 358.  See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (“[D]isparate decisions in 
various Circuits might leave [federal criminal law] insufficiently certain . . . [and] such a 
circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough.”).  
 359.  For instance, whether a Terry stop constitutes “custody” under Miranda doctrine. 
Compare United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a suspect is 
not in custody based on lawful Terry stop), with United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (deeming reasonableness of Terry stop irrelevant, and instead examining whether the 
circumstances of stop qualify as custody); see also, e.g., United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602, 
604 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting existence of a split on whether the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest 
silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment).  
 360.  Although beyond the scope of the current study, compelling reason exists to extend 
certification beyond the constitutional criminal procedure realm, where, while deprivations of 
physical liberty might not be implicated, important Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment 
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positively affect constitutional litigation concerning federal civil rights 
more generally, where circuit disuniformity can influence whether 
police violated a “clearly established” right.361 
Constitutional consistency has been prized since the nation’s 
origin. Nevertheless, scant attention has been paid to the actual 
variability of national constitutional law resulting from the decisions 
of intermediate federal appellate courts. Except for a few fleeting 
references offered decades ago,362 focus on circuit constitutional law 
splits, including those that affect criminal procedure rights,363 has 
been lacking. This Article has helped redress this empirical deficit and 
highlighted the negative consequences associated with Fourth 
Amendment circuit splits in particular, hopefully setting the stage for 
increased attention to this critically important yet ignored aspect of 
American constitutionalism. 
 
civil liberties can be subject to variable circuit treatment, resulting in inconsistent rights 
allocation.  
 361.  See supra Part III.B.2.  
 362.  Most notably, the congressional testimony of Justice Byron White, who while 
condemning “federal law being enforced differently in different parts of the country,” singled out 
for concern varied views on what qualifies as an illegal search. See Intercircuit Panel of the 
United States Act: Hearings on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm., 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1985) (testimony of Justice Byron White). 
 363.  See supra notes 42–65 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX A 
Issue Date Split 
Emerged364 
  
Search and Seizure Practices  
  
Whether police can safety “sweep” a residence, 
under Maryland v. Buie (1990), without first 
arresting an occupant365  
2001366 
  
Whether refusal to provide consent to search home 
by nonpresent resident trumps consent later 
provided by a resident who is present367 
2008368 
  
Whether police can engage in warrantless search of 
a container that is so distinctive that its contents 
are a foregone conclusion, allowing for plain view 
search (“single purpose container” doctrine)369 
2005370 
  
Whether retention of identification for period longer 
than needed to verify identity constitutes a 
seizure371 
2002372 
  
 
 364.  The issues indicated in the Appendix concern “live” splits that continue to exist, at the 
time of this writing, based on conflicts manifest during the study period. 
 365.  United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 2006) (disagreeing with, 
inter alia, United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 150 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1011 
(2005)).  
 366.  United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir.) (disagreeing with United States v. 
Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 981 (2001). 
 367.  United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2008) (disagreeing with 
United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009). 
 368.  United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Melloy, J., 
dissenting) (noting variant approach of United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 369.  United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 2005) (disagreeing with, inter alia, 
United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
 370.  Id.; see also Allison M. Lucifer, Comment, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The 
Single-Purpose Container Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1809 (2009) 
(discussing ongoing split).  
 371.  United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir.) (disagreeing with, inter alia, 
United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 847 (2002). 
 372.  Id. 
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Whether police seizure, supported by reasonable 
suspicion, can be prolonged by asking questions 
unrelated to seizure basis373 
2011374 
  
Whether police seizure, supported by probable 
cause, can be prolonged by asking questions 
unrelated to seizure basis375 
2011376 
  
Whether identity of person discovered as a result of 
unlawful seizure by police, resulting in person’s 
arrest on unrelated basis, is suppressible377 
2001378 
  
Whether police can seize an individual without a 
warrant based on reasonable suspicion of a 
completed misdemeanor (versus felony)379 
2007380 
  
Whether a stop for a minor traffic violation can be 
based on reasonable suspicion (not probable 
cause)381 
2008382 
  
 
 373.  United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 767–68 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting 
disagreement with United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002)).  
 374.  Id. The Guijdon-Ortiz court emphasized that the issue differed from that resolved in 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), which held that unrelated questioning that does not 
prolong a stop is permissible. Id. at 766. 
 375.  Id. at 768 n.9 (noting disagreement with United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829 (2002)). 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 449–50 (5th Cir.) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1109 (10th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 158 (2010).  
 378.  United States v. Guevera, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting disagreement with, inter 
alia, United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 975 
(1994)). 
 379.  United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1142 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement 
with Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008).  
 380.  United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement with 
Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Cecilia R. Byrne, Comment, To 
Stop or Not to Stop: The Application or Misapplication of Hensley to Completed Misdemeanors, 
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191 (2010) (discussing split).  
 381.  United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting disagreement 
with, inter alia, United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
535 U.S. 1072 (2002)). 
 382.  Id. 
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Whether police violate Payton v. New York (1980), 
which requires an arrest warrant for an in-home 
arrest, when, lacking a warrant, they announce 
their presence and arrest resident who voluntarily 
opens door383 
2004384 
  
How to define “reason to believe” resident is at 
home, standard established in Payton v. New York 
(1980), in justifying home entry with arrest 
warrant385 
1999386 
  
Whether “grab area” of arrestee, under United 
States v. Chimel (1969), is determined at time of the 
arrest or when search is conducted (nonautomobile 
context)387 
2002388 
  
Whether police, acting on the basis of apparent 
authority to give consent to search, can search a 
closed container when faced with ambiguity over 
container’s ownership389 
2010390 
  
 
 383.  Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting disagreement with, inter 
alia, United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 824 (2001)). 
 384.  Id.  
 385.  United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with, inter 
alia, Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 937 
(2007). 
 386.  United States v. Valdez, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting disagreement 
with United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 387.  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 
(1984)). 
 388.  Id.  
 389.  United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) 
(noting majority’s split with United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 390.  Id. The split, which actually entails three doctrinal positions, arguably dates back to 
2006, when the Second Circuit in Snype sub silentio differed with the Seventh Circuit’s position 
in United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Brian Jones, Note, Keep 
Closed Containers Closed: Resolving the Circuit Split in Favor of Individual Privacy, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 303 (2011) (discussing split more generally).  
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Whether suspicionless collection of DNA sample is 
governed by “special needs” or “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis391 
1999392 
  
Whether a protective “frisk” of an auto interior, 
based on Michigan v. Long (1983), is justified by 
officers’ subjective or objective fear for their personal 
safety393 
2000394 
  
Whether the “community caretaking” doctrine, 
traditionally applicable in the auto context, permits 
warrantless entry of home395 
2010396 
  
Whether impoundment of auto per “community 
caretaking” doctrine, resulting in inventory, must be 
based on standardized procedure397 
2006398 
  
Whether “special needs” exception justifies 
warrantless strip search of juvenile399 
1990400 
 
 391.  United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004)), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). 
 392.  Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting disagreement with Jones v. 
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992)).  
 393. United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 822 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 1999)).  
 394. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Brian Puchalsky, 
Note, Weapon on Board? A Proposal to Solve the Riddle of the Nonprotective Search, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 706 (2007) (discussing split more generally).  
 395.  Ray v. Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with, inter 
alia, United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 396.  Id. Here, as elsewhere, the split can be said to actually have arisen much earlier, sub 
silentio, without explicit recognition by the circuits. Compare, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 
F.3d 1506, 1511 (6th Cir. 1996) (extending community caretaking doctrine to justify warrantless 
home entry), with United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208–09 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting 
extension of the doctrine). See generally Megan Pauline Marinos, Comment, Breaking and 
Entering or Community Caretaking? A Solution to the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory 
Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 249 (2012).  
 397.  United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 238 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1029 
(1999)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1149 (2007).  
 398.  Id.  
 399.  Doe v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 400.  Landstron v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(noting disagreement with Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 
1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
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Whether prior child sex-molestation conviction can 
serve as probable cause to get child pornography 
search warrant401 
2010402 
  
Whether brief submission to officer’s show of 
authority, as suggested in California v. Hodari D. 
(1991), constitutes seizure403 
1994404 
  
Whether a search warrant lacking in requisite 
particularity can be cured by mere reference to 
warrant attachment, when the attachment was not 
appended to the warrant at the time of execution405 
1988406 
  
Whether police can seize an individual based on a 
reasonable mistake of substantive law407 
1999408 
  
 
 401.  United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 154 
(2009)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (2011). 
 402.  Id.  
 403.  United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement with 
United States v. Morgan, 936 F.3d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1222 
(2008).  
 404.  United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting disagreement 
with United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1102 
(1992)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1171 (1995); see also Darby G. Sullivan, Note, Continuing Seizure 
and the Fourth Amendment: Conceptual Discord and Evidentiary Uncertainty in United States v. 
Dupree, 55 VILL. L. REV. 235 (2010) (discussing split more generally).  
 405.  United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Hurwitz court was 
at pains to emphasize that Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), did not resolve the question 
because in Groh the supporting document at issue was neither incorporated by reference nor 
attached to the warrant. Id. at 471. 
 406.  United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 n.20 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting disagreement 
with United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 
(1983)).  
 407.  United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 827 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting 
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 408.  United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir.) (noting that Circuit’s reasonable 
mistake of law exception was recognized in United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 
1999)), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1121 (2005).  
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Whether “plain view” exception in digital evidence 
searches allows use of discovered evidence that 
relates to other crimes409 
2010410 
  
Whether Terry frisk vitiates voluntariness of 
subsequent consent to search411 
2011412 
  
Whether facts known by fellow officers, but not 
communicated to officers executing search/seizure 
(“collective knowledge” doctrine), can be used to 
justify same413  
1996414 
  
Whether consent given by resident to confidential 
informant justifies warrantless home entry by police 
(“consent once removed” doctrine)415 
2007416 
  
Whether prisoners have reasonable privacy 
expectation in attorney mail417 
1995418 
  
  
 
 409.  United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on 
other grounds, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010)). 
 410.  Id.  
 411.  United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 578 (6th Cir. 2011) (Kethledge, J., 
dissenting) (noting disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046, 1050 
(8th Cir. 2000)). 
 412.  Id.  
 413.  United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 493–94 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting 
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 414.  United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503–04 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting 
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 415.  United States v. Callahan, 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement 
with, inter alia, United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 807 (6th Cir. 2005)), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 416.  Id.  
 417.  Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir.) (noting disagreement with Brewer v. 
Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123 (1994)), cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 820 (2008).  
 418.  Biergu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting disagreement with Brewer), 
abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).  
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Exclusionary Rule Reach and Applicability  
  
Standing: whether driver of rental vehicle, lacking 
formal approval on rental agreement, can challenge 
validity of the vehicle’s search, when renter has 
given driver permission to operate vehicle419 
2001420 
  
Standing: whether defendant, in addition to having 
standing to challenge primary police illegality, must 
also have possessory or proprietary interest in fruit 
he or she seeks to suppress421 
2006422 
  
“Inevitable discovery”: level of certitude required in 
assessing if, presuming absence of illegality, 
challenged evidence would have ultimately been 
discovered, thus allowing for admissibility423 
2006424 
  
“Inevitable discovery”: whether an independent line 
of lawful investigation must be underway at the 
time of illegal discovery of evidence425 
1992426 
  
 
 419. United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 166–69 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting disagreement 
with, inter alia, United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 997 (2012).  
 420.  United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 582–86 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting disagreement 
with, inter alia, United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Darren M. 
Goldman, Comment, Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split: Why Unauthorized Rental Drivers 
Should Be Denied Fourth Amendment Standing, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1687 (2009) (discussing split 
more generally).  
 421.  United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1118 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting 
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Bowley, 453 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 422.  Id.  
 423.  United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with, inter 
alia, Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1105 
(2005)).  
 424.  Id.  
 425.  United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985)).  
 426.  United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1056 (1987)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994).  
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“Attenuation”: whether discovery of lawful 
outstanding arrest warrant attenuates taint of 
initial unlawful seizure, allowing for admission of 
evidence427 
2010428 
  
“Good faith”: whether exception applies when 
affidavit supporting search warrant is tainted by 
mention of evidence illegally secured429 
2005430 
  
Appellate Review  
  
Standard for assessing trial court denial of defense 
motion for evidentiary hearing under Franks v. 
Delaware (1978)431 
2002432 
  
Standard for reviewing trial determination of what 
constitutes curtilage433 
2002434 
  
Standard for reviewing trial court determination of 
the scope of defendant’s consent to search435 
2002436 
  
 
 427.  United States v. Gross, 624 F.3d 309, 321 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with 
United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 2004)), amended on other grounds, 662 
F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 428.  Id.  
 429.  United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 
(2006). 
 430.  Id.  
 431.  United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 490 (11th Cir.) (noting several-circuit split), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 826 (2011).  
 432.  United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 843 n.44 (D.C. Cir.) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936 
(1991)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 (1993). 
 433.  United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting disagreement with 
United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 434.  Id.  
 435.  United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting disagreement with 
United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 436.  Id.  
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 437.  United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting disagreement with, 
inter alia, United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 438.  Id. The Mask court emphasized that Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), 
holding that the legality of an acknowledged seizure is subject to de novo appellate review, did 
not change the Fifth Circuit’s longstanding position that whether a seizure occurred is a factual 
determination subject to clear error/abuse of discretion appellate review. Id. at 335 (citing United 
States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1098 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 921 
(1993)).  
